Indonesian maritime security cooperation in the Malacca Straits by Matthews, Alfred Daniel
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2015-06
Indonesian maritime security cooperation in the
Malacca Straits
Matthews, Alfred Daniel














Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
INDONESIAN MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION 








Thesis Advisor:  Robert E. Looney 
Co-Advisor: James A. Russell 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
June 2015 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE   
INDONESIAN MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE MALACCA 
STRAITS 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Alfred Daniel Matthews 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ____N/A____.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
This thesis argues that Indonesia’s sensitivity about its sovereignty in the Malacca Straits and Indonesia’s preference 
toward regional security cooperation determines Indonesia’s policy in rejecting and accepting multilateral cooperation 
in the Straits. This thesis then analyzes the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), MALSINDO, Eyes-in-the-
Sky (EiS), and the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships 
(ReCAAP) initiatives, and examines how Indonesia responded to these initiatives. 
This thesis finds the following: First, regarding international effort to enhance the security cooperation in the 
Straits, Indonesia’s sensitivity and its wariness of internationalizing the Straits remains a big challenge for the 
extraregional states’ security initiatives in securing the Malacca Straits. Second, regarding the regional cooperation in 
the Straits, even though Indonesia prefers regional cooperation, it would still limit its cooperation when dealing with 
the sovereignty issue. Third, regarding the security cooperation with extraregional powers, Indonesia prefers a 






14. SUBJECT TERMS  
maritime security, Indonesia, archipelagic state concept, Wawasan Nusantara (nusantara concept), 
Indonesian waters, bebas-aktif policy, ASEAN, regional cooperation, regional maritime security 
initiative (RMSI), MALSINDO, eyes in the sky (EiS), ReCAAP. 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
95 

















NSN 7540–01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 
 ii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 




Alfred Daniel Matthews 
Commander, Indonesian Navy 
M.Si., Indonesian Defense University, 2011 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 

























Mohammed M. Hafez 
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs 
 iv 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis argues that Indonesia’s sensitivity about its sovereignty in the Malacca Straits 
and Indonesia’s preference toward regional security cooperation determines Indonesia’s 
policy in rejecting and accepting multilateral cooperation in the Straits. This thesis then 
analyzes the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), MALSINDO, Eyes-in-the-
Sky (EiS), and the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed 
Robbery against Ships (ReCAAP) initiatives, and examines how Indonesia responded to 
these initiatives. 
This thesis finds the following: First, regarding international effort to enhance the 
security cooperation in the Straits, Indonesia’s sensitivity and its wariness of 
internationalizing the Straits remains a big challenge for the extraregional states’ security 
initiatives in securing the Malacca Straits. Second, regarding the regional cooperation in 
the Straits, even though Indonesia prefers regional cooperation, it would still limit its 
cooperation when dealing with the sovereignty issue. Third, regarding the security 
cooperation with extraregional powers, Indonesia prefers a bilateral security cooperation 
framework in securing the Straits. 
 vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION................................................................1 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION .................................1 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................2 
1. Indonesian Rejection of the RMSI and ReCAAP .............................3 
2. Indonesian Acceptance of the MALSINDO and EiS ........................5 
3. The Factors ...........................................................................................7 
a. Indonesia’s Sensitivity about Sovereignty Issues ....................7 
b. Indonesia’s Preference for Regional Cooperation ..................7 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES .............................8 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN .....................................................................................9 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW .....................................................................................9 
II. INDONESIAN SOVEREIGNTY IN THE MALACCA STRAITS ......................11 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................11 
B. THE ROOTS OF INDONESIAN SOVEREIGNTY IN THE 
STRAITS ........................................................................................................11 
1. The Archipelagic State Concept .......................................................14 
2. The Wawasan Nusantara Concept ....................................................20 
3. Indonesia and Malaysia Agreement in the Malacca Straits...........22 
4. The UNCLOS III................................................................................23 
C. INTERNATIONAL CHALLENGES TO TERRITORIAL CLAIMS 
IN THE STRAITS..........................................................................................25 
1. Japan’s Responses to Territorial Claims in the Straits ..................27 
2. U.S. Responses to Territorial Claims in the Straits ........................28 
3. Singapore’s Responses to Territorial Claims in the Straits ...........30 
D. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................31 
III. INDONESIAN PREFERENCE FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION ................33 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................33 
B. THE ROOT OF INDONESIA’S OPPOSITION AGAINST 
FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN REGIONAL SECURITY .....................33 
1. The Bebas-Aktif (Independent-Active) Policy. ................................34 
2. Commitment to Nonalignment Movement (NAM). ........................36 
3. Opposition to Military Pacts .............................................................38 
C. INDONESIA’S REGIONAL ACTIVISM ...................................................39 
1. The Establishment of ASEAN...........................................................40 
2. ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality) .....................43 
3. ASEAN Way .......................................................................................44 
4. Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) ........................................45 
5. The Promotion of the Regional Resilience Concept........................46 
D. INDONESIAN MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE 
MALACCA STRAITS PRIOR TO 2004 .....................................................47 
 viii 
1. INDONESIA-SINGAPORE COORDINATED PATROL 
(ISCP) ..................................................................................................47 
2. INDONESIA-MALAYSIA COORDINATED PATROL 
(IMCP) ................................................................................................49 
E. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................49 
IV. THE REJECTION AND THE ACCEPTANCE .....................................................51 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................51 
B. MULTILATERAL MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION 
INITIATIVES IN THE MALACCA STRAITS..........................................51 
1. The Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) ........................52 
2. The MALSINDO ................................................................................56 
3. The Eyes in the Sky (EiS) ..................................................................58 
4. The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy 
and Armed Robbery Against Ships (ReCAAP) ..............................60 
C. FINDINGS ......................................................................................................62 
D. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................63 
V. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................65 
LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................69 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................77 
 
 ix 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Illustrative Map of Indonesia Territorial Based on the TZMKO 1939. ...........14 
Figure 2. Map of Indonesia Territory Based on Act No. 4/1960 Concerning 
Indonesian Waters (with 12 Miles Territorial Waters Breadth). .....................19 
Figure 3. Illustrative Map of Indonesia Territorial and Exclusive Economy Zone 
(EEZ)................................................................................................................25 
Figure 4. The Malacca Straits (The Strait of Malacca and the Strait of Singapore). ......27 
 
 x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. IMO Report on Actual and Attempted Piracy Incidents. ...................................2 
 
 xii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ASA Association of Southeast Asia 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
CMPT  Combined Maritime Patrol Team 
DEPHANKAM Indonesian Department of Defense and Security 
DOD U.S. Department of Defense 
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone 
EiS  Eyes in the Sky 
IMB  International Maritime Bureau 
IMCO Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization 
IMO  International Maritime Organization 
LEMHANAS Indonesian Institute of National Defense 
MAA  Monitoring and Action Agency 
NAM Nonalignment Movement 
ReCAAP  Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed 
Robbery Against Ships 
RMSI  Regional Maritime Security Initiative 
SLOC Sea Lines of Communication 
TAC Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
TSS Traffic Separation Scheme 
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
ZOPFAN Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality 
 xiv 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my thesis advisor, Professor 
Robert E. Looney, and co-advisor, Professor James A. Russell, for their patience, 
support, and guidance throughout the research. I would also like to extend my special 
thanks to Ms. Cheryl Huddleston and Ms. Marianne Taflinger for coaching me through 
the writing process. 
I dedicate this thesis to my wife, Shely, for her endless love, support, and 
encouragement. Thank you for the prayers, love, and patience throughout this process. 





“The fear of the LORD is the beginning of knowledge, but fools despise wisdom 
and instruction.” 
 xvi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
In 2004, Indonesia rejected the U.S. multilateral cooperation initiative, the 
Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI). In the same year, however, Indonesia 
accepted a trilateral-coordinated naval patrol with Malaysia and Singapore, known as the 
MALSINDO, to combat armed robbery and piracy in the Malacca Straits. The following 
year, Indonesia was involved in Malaysia’s multilateral initiative, the Eyes-in-the-Sky 
(EiS) air patrol. In 2006, Indonesia rejected Japan’s lead initiative of the Regional 
Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships 
(ReCAAP). This thesis examines the relationship between these policies with factors 
such as Indonesia’s sensitivity about sovereignty issues in the Malacca Straits and 
Indonesia’s preference for regional cooperation. This thesis attempts to address whether 
these factors have affected Indonesia’s policy to reject RMSI and ReCAAP, while 
accepting the MALSINDO and EiS. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Cooperation among stakeholders in the Malacca Straits is important for avoiding 
conflict because the global economy greatly depends on the safety and security of the 
straits. Heightened piracy incidents in the straits have raised international pressure on the 
littoral states. With regard to global dependence, foreign intervention, especially by the 
user states with security issues in the straits, would be unavoidable. Conversely, such 
intervention is also unacceptable for the littoral states, since parts of the straits have been 
enclosed within their territorial waters. Furthermore, the complexity of maritime law 
regarding territory, the freedom of navigation in the straits, and the various interpretations 
of the definition of piracy are creating vagueness about the legal provisions. 
The thesis has two important implications for the understanding of Indonesia’s 
policy in the Malacca Straits. First, the acceptance of the MALSINDO and EiS 
demonstrated the dynamic within Indonesia’s policy-making process toward a broader 
cooperative framework than a bilateral one. Second, the rejection of RMSI and ReCAAP 
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implies Indonesian resistance and cautiousness about a multilateral framework beyond 
the immediate littoral states. Therefore, it is important to understand Indonesia’s policy 
regarding maritime security cooperation to provide understanding of Indonesia’s stand, 
and to develop effective and efficient cooperation between Indonesia and other 
stakeholders to deal with security problems in the Malacca Straits. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
At the international level, heightened armed robbery and piracy incidents had 
raised user states’ concern and had put pressure on littoral states to secure the straits, 
especially Indonesia, whose waters were judged to be the most piracy-polluted waters in 
the world.1 The 2004 International Maritime Bureau’s (IMB) report on actual and 
attempted attacks showed a significant level of piratical incidents in Indonesian waters 
compared to other areas in the region; see Table 1. The table also showed an increasing 
trend of piratical incidents in the Malacca Straits from 2001 until 2004.  
Table 1.   IMO Report on Actual and Attempted Piracy Incidents.2  
Location/ Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Indonesia 119 91 103 121 93 
Malacca Straits 75 17 16 28 37 
Malaysia 21 19 14 5 9 
Singapore Straits 5 7 5 2 8 
 
In the context of maritime terrorism, a single incident can greatly harm the safety 
and security of the straits. Therefore, the United States promoted the Regional Maritime 
                                                 
1 Jayant Abhyankar, “Piracy, Armed Robbery and Terrorism at Sea: A Global and 
Regional Outlook,” in Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Malacca Straits, ed. Graham 
Gerard Ong-Webb (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), 7. 
2 After IMO report “Table 1: Location of ACTUAL and ATTEMPTED attacks, Jan to Dec 
1993–2004,” in “Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ship Annual Report 1 January–31 




Security Initiative (RMSI) proposal to bolster security for Southeast Asia.3 Indonesia, 
however, rejected the U.S. proposal; Indonesia was wary that the presence of U.S. forces 
could infringe on its sovereignty in the straits. Interestingly, after rejecting the RMSI, 
Indonesia accepted the MALSINDO cooperative framework. Therefore, Indonesia 
showed its preference to the regional security cooperative framework rather than foreign 
initiative. 
Indonesia, however, continued to maintain its preferences for a regional 
cooperative framework rather than involving extraregional power in the security 
management in the straits. In June 2005, the Joint War Committee of the Lloyd’s 
insurance market declared the Malacca Straits to be an area at risk from “war, strike, 
terrorism, and related perils.”4 As a result, insurers have raised premiums for the ships 
transiting the Malacca Straits, which was a blow to the shipping industry.5 As a response, 
user states urged the littoral states to enhance the safety and security of the straits. 
Finally, three months after the Malacca Straits were designated as the “war zone,” 
Indonesia enhanced its cooperation by accepting the Eyes-in-the-Sky (EiS) multilateral 
air patrol with Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. In contrast, in 2006, Indonesia refused 
to join ReCAAP—a Japan-led multilateral cooperative effort—even though most of 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members have joined the ReCAAP. 
Therefore, this thesis suggests that Indonesian reluctance to accept foreign security 
initiatives over the straits does not stem only from its preferences for regional 
cooperation. 
1. Indonesian Rejection of the RMSI and ReCAAP 
The Malacca Straits is strategically important for Indonesia. In the relevant 
literature, J.N. Mak argues that Indonesia decided to oppose RMSI because Indonesia 
                                                 
3 Yeoh En-Lai, “U.S. to Discuss Defending Straits from Terrorists,” Global Security 
Newswire, June 3, 2004, http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/us-to-discuss-defending-straits-from-
terrorists/. 





fears its sovereignty would be eroded by foreign military presence in the straits.6 
Similarly, John F. Bradford contends that Indonesia’s reluctance to join ReCAAP “stems 
from the belief that the cooperation undermines the concept of unique state sovereignty in 
the Straits of Malacca.”7 Furthermore, Mak argued that the Malacca Straits are of critical 
strategic importance for Indonesia since it is the only waterway that pierces the 
Indonesian archipelagic border.8 He contended that any erosion of Indonesian 
sovereignty in the Malacca Straits “would have serious impact for Indonesia attempts to 
regulate traffics [sic] in its other straits used for international navigation.”9 However, 
since Indonesia’s policy has evolved to accept multilateral cooperation with other littoral 
states, then the sovereignty factor could explain only the rejection of international 
cooperation initiatives but not the acceptance of multilateral cooperation among the 
littoral states. 
Another possible explanation for Indonesia’s rejection of RMSI and ReCAAP 
was Indonesia’s lack of economic interest. Huang contends that Indonesia has smaller 
stakes in the safety and security in the Malacca Straits compared to other littoral states 
since the majority of Indonesia’s trade is conducted through the Lombok and the Sunda 
Straits. He argues that Indonesia focuses more on domestic issues such as economic 
development, political reform, and territorial integrity. The situation then was worsened 
by the Indonesian Navy’s inability to patrol its vast territorial waters and the Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) due to a lack of funding and poor maintenance of its ships.10 
However, Huang’s argument is insufficient to explain why Indonesia strongly rejected 
the RMSI initiative. Moreover, if financial constraints were the main reason for 
Indonesia’s lesser attention to the security and safety issues in the Malacca Straits, then 
                                                 
6 J.N. Mak, “Unilateralism and Regionalism: Working Together and Alone in the Malacca Straits,” in 
Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Malacca Straits, ed. Graham Gerard Ong-Webb (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), 153. 
7 John F. Bradford, “Shifting the Tides against Piracy in Southeast Asian Waters,” Asian Survey 48, 
no. 3 (May/June 2008): 489. 
8 Mak, “Unilateralism and Regionalism,” 139. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Victor Huang, “Building Maritime Security in Southeast Asia—Outsider Not Welcome?” MINDEF 
Singapore, April 24, 2010, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/publications/pointer/journals/2007/
v33n3/feature3.html. 
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the argument is insufficient to explain why Indonesia rejected the RMSI when the U.S. 
government had pledged to allocate $2 billion for its implementation;11 or, similarly, why 
Indonesia rejected ReCAAP, in which membership funding is based on voluntary 
contributions. After all, Singapore was willing to bear the cost of the ReCAAP 
organization’s entire startup costs, as well as the annual cost of operations for the 
Information Sharing Center (ISC).12 
In summary, two explanations of Indonesia’s noncooperation toward RMSI and 
ReCAAP appear in the literature. First, the rejection stemmed from Indonesia’s concern 
that such cooperation would impinge on its sovereignty in the straits, and second, the 
rejection was rooted in Indonesia’s lack of economic interests. However, since a “lack of 
economic interest” argument cannot explain Indonesia’s strong rejection of RMSI and 
ReCAAP, the sovereignty argument is analyzed in this thesis.  
2. Indonesian Acceptance of the MALSINDO and EiS 
During the increase in piracy incidents in the early 1990s, Indonesia engaged in 
maritime security cooperation with its neighbor to secure the straits. In June 1992, 
responding to the rise of armed robbery incidents in the straits, Indonesia and Singapore 
agreed to establish INDOSIN to patrol the Straits of Singapore.13 In the same year, 
Indonesia and Malaysia also initiated MALINDO in the Straits of Malacca.14 All of the 
cooperation above was conducted within a bilateral framework. Therefore, during this 
period until 2004, Indonesia relied on bilateral security cooperation measures with its 
neighbors.  
                                                 
11 Senia Febrica, “Explaining Indonesia’s Participation in Maritime Security Cooperation” (PhD diss., 
University of Glasgow, 2014). 
12 Joshua H. Ho, “The Security of Sea Lanes in Southeast Asia,” Asian Survey 46, no. 4 (July/August, 
2006): 571. 
13 Yann-huei Song, “Security in the Straits of Malacca and the Regional Maritime Security Initiative: 
Response to the U.S. Proposal,” in Global Legal Challenges: Command of the Commons, Strategic 
Communication, and Natural Disasters (International Law Studies 83), ed. Michael D. Carsten (Newport, 
RI: U.S. Naval War College, 2007): 121. 
14 Ibid. 
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In June 2004, Indonesia’s policy shifted to accept multilateral security 
cooperation in the Malacca Straits. Indonesia accepted the MALSINDO maritime 
security cooperation with Malaysia and Singapore. The cooperation has widened the 
security framework in the straits from bilateral to trilateral framework. Nevertheless, due 
to concerns over sovereignty, the three countries agreed to cooperate under a coordinated 
patrol rather than a joint one15 and do not allow participants’ law enforcement vessels to 
engage in hot pursuit into neighboring waters.16 Therefore, despite upgraded cooperation, 
the procedures were still the same as MALINDO or INDOSIN. 
In September 2005, Indonesia agreed to augment the Eyes in the Sky (EiS) 
initiative with the MALSINDO. It is considered a significant change, as the cooperation 
allowed air patrol assets to fly above the waters of a neighboring country no less than 
three nautical miles from land. Furthermore, EiS also broadened its participants to 
include Thailand as an observer; later in 2008, Thailand became a member of EiS.17 In 
general, each country now contributes two air patrol sorties per week. Each of these 
sorties has a Combined Maritime Patrol Team (CMPT), consisting of a representative of 
each country’s military officers on board. They share information and provide their 
respective Monitoring and Action Agencies (MAAs) with information on suspicious 
contact through designated radio frequencies.18 EiS has enhanced the maritime security 
cooperation in the straits. 
In summary, during 2004 and 2005, Indonesia changed its policy to accept 
multilateral cooperation among the littoral states. The MALSINDO sea patrol 
cooperation was a starting point for the shift from the bilateral-only policy. The EiS air 
patrol shows a more significant shift toward greater multilateral cooperation by accepting 
                                                 
15 In coordinated patrol, each member state has its own patrol task-group that works independently but 
establishes close coordination with its counterparts. Conversely, a joint patrol requires all states works 
within one patrol task-group. 
16 Tamara Renee Shie, “Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia: The Evolution and Progress of Intra-
ASEAN Cooperation,” in Piracy in Southeast Asia, Status Issues, and Responses, ed. Derek Johnson and 
Mark Valencia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), 179. 
17 Ho, “Security of Sea Lanes in Southeast Asia,” 560. 
18 Ibid. 
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Thailand as a participant and providing a broader cooperative framework to include data 
sharing between participants.  
3. The Factors 
a. Indonesia’s Sensitivity about Sovereignty Issues  
Indonesia claims its territorial waters in the Malacca Straits. In 1960, Indonesia 
unilaterally claimed its sovereignty over 12 nautical miles (NM) breadth in the Straits 
through the stipulation of Decree No. 4 on Indonesian territorial waters. In August 1969, 
the situation became critical after Malaysia followed Indonesia’s move to claim 12 NM 
territorial waters in the Straits.19 Therefore, both countries claimed their territorial waters 
of 12 NM in the Straits. As a result, within areas with less than 24 miles breadth, the 
waters are completely within both Indonesian and Malaysian jurisdiction. Therefore, this 
move challenged the customary status of the Malacca Straits as International Straits.  
Indonesia’s moves, of course, do not please the major maritime states, which 
consider the straits as international waters. The United States, Great Britain, France, and 
other major maritime powers challenged Indonesia’s claim by advocating freedom of 
navigation in the straits.20 Other states, like Japan, concerned about navigational safety, 
wanted to internationalize the safety and security management of the straits.21 In 
response to this situation, Indonesia jealously guarded its sovereignty in the Malacca 
Straits and become sensitive and cautious about any initiative in the straits that might 
impinge its sovereignty. 
b. Indonesia’s Preference for Regional Cooperation  
A constructivist approach might be best to explain the preference for regional 
cooperation. Constructivists argue that regarding potential partners for security 
cooperation, states filter each other through shared identities and ideas.22 Moreover, 
                                                 
19 Yaacov Vertzberger, “The Malacca/Singapore Straits,” Asian Survey 22, no. 7 (1982): 610. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Mak, “Unilateralism and Regionalism,,” 147 
22 Zeev Maoz, Networks of Nations: The Evolution, Structure, and Impact of International Networks; 
1816–2001 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 180. 
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constructivists point out, “The shared identities stemmed from cultural similarity or 
normative (democratic) affinity.”23 As a result, states with similar cultural characteristics 
tend to trust each other more than those with dissimilar ones.24 In an ASEAN context, 
defining a member’s identity was the founding leaders’ greatest concern.25 ASEAN has 
long built its shared identity through an incremental socialization and a long-term process 
of interaction and adjustment in the member-states’ political, cultural and economic 
relations.26 Therefore, it might be worth considering that Indonesia, in the context of 
security cooperation, prefers to cooperate with other ASEAN countries rather than with 
foreign powers. 
All littoral countries in the Malacca Straits are ASEAN members who honor 
principle that called the “ASEAN Way,” which is characterized by musyawarah 
(consultation) and mufakat (consensus) within a decision-making process.27  This 
principle stresses informality and intensive consultation leading to consensus and 
peaceful resolution of disputes and promotes cooperation among ASEAN members.28 
According to this line of argument, Indonesia should be more likely to cooperate with 
ASEAN member states compared to extraregional states.  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES  
Two potential reasons offered to explain the factors previously detailed are as follows: 
• First, the sensitivity of Indonesian government over sovereignty issues in 
the straits would be more likely to hinder Indonesia in accepting 
multilateral security initiatives involving foreign powers.  
• Two, the preference of Indonesian government toward regional 
cooperation would be more likely to pull Indonesia to engage in 
multilateral cooperation with other littoral states in the Malacca Straits 
than with extraregional powers. 
                                                 
23 Maoz, Network of Nation, 180. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem 
of Regional Order (New York: Routledge, 2001), 86. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Shie, “Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia,” 169. 
28 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia, 78. 
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Therefore, the hypothesis is that the combination of these two factors could affect 
Indonesia’s policy in accepting and rejecting multilateral security cooperation in the 
Malacca Straits. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis determines whether factors such as the sensitivity of Indonesian 
government over sovereignty issues in the Malacca Straits, and Indonesian government’s 
preference for regional cooperation have affected Indonesia’s decision to reject RMSI 
and ReCAAP, and on the other hand, to accept the MALSINDO and EiS. In doing so, I 
analyze statements and responses from various actors in Indonesian civil and military 
institutions regarding the acceptance of the MALSINDO and EiS, and the rejection of 
RMSI and ReCAAP. 
I use a variety of sources, including books, journals, policy papers, web sources, 
and newspapers as my first or second sources of information to gather the evidence. I 
have limited web sources only to reputable sources. I did not conduct any focus groups or 
interviews. I include my empirical experiences, especially in describing sea patrol in the 
Malacca Straits. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis consists of five chapters, including the introduction in the first chapter 
and the conclusion in the last chapter. The first chapter explains the purpose of the thesis, 
contains a literature review, and details the methodology and the organization of the 
chapters. The second chapter examines the roots of Indonesian sovereignty in the 
Malacca Straits. The third chapter explores Indonesia’s preference for regional 
cooperation on maritime security issues  
The fourth chapter analyzes the acceptance of the MALSINDO and EiS and the 
rejection of RMSI and ReCAAP. This chapter analyzes whether factors such as 
Indonesia’s sensitivity to sovereignty issues in the straits, and Indonesia’s preferences for 
regional cooperation had determined Indonesia’s decision to accept the MALSINDO and 
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EiS, and to reject RMSI and ReCAAP. The fifth chapter presents the conclusion and the 
recommendation. 
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II. INDONESIAN SOVEREIGNTY IN THE MALACCA STRAITS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explains the sensitivity of the Indonesian government over 
sovereignty issues in the Malacca Straits. This chapter then argues that Indonesia’s 
sensitivity derived from the conflicting interests between Indonesia and the user states of 
the straits, especially the major maritime countries. Wary of its security regarding its 
strategic crossroads position, Indonesia continues to exert control over the use of the 
straits within its territorial waters. Conversely, the major maritime countries have 
emphasized the freedom of navigation principles and the important function of the 
Malacca Straits as an international strait; therefore, they oppose any territorial claims to 
the straits. 
To explore this phenomenon, this chapter is organized into two sections. The first 
section reviews brief accounts of Indonesia’s concept of its territorial limits as an 
archipelagic state, which was institutionalized in the Juanda Declaration, and the concept 
of Wawasan Nusantara. This section also describes the agreement between Indonesia and 
Malaysia over territorial claims to the Malacca Straits and the role of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which supports Indonesia’s archipelagic 
state claim.  
The second section of this chapter addresses the international responses to 
territorial claims in the Malacca Straits, followed by a brief explanation of the response 
from countries such as Japan, the United States, and Singapore, toward territorial claims 
in the Malacca Straits. The chapter illustrates the conflicting interests of the major 
maritime states over freedom of navigation, and navigation safety and security against 
Indonesia’s territorial claim in the straits. 
B. THE ROOTS OF INDONESIAN SOVEREIGNTY IN THE STRAITS 
After the end of the World War II, most of the newly independent coastal states 
like Indonesia, Philippine, and other else wanted to extend their maritime territorial limits 
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to at least 12 miles, or even more.29 Out of 101 states that became members of the United 
Nations (UN) from 1946 to 1980, only three of them agreed to maintain the three miles 
sea limit.30 J.N. Mak argued that, ironically, it was the United States that triggered the 
rush to fence off the sea.31 Indeed, in 1945, through declaration of the Truman Doctrine, 
the United States was among the first countries to claim sovereignty over the resources of 
the continental shelf contiguous to the U.S. coast.32 Since then, many countries followed 
the United States’ steps to fence off the sea, not only over the continental shelf like the 
United States did, but also over the waters and the air above it.  
Indonesia redefined its maritime territorial limits on the basis of security over its 
geographic concerns. Since the end of the Indonesian revolution in 1949, Indonesia had 
been concerned that its own archipelagic waterways were being used by external powers, 
threatening Indonesian security; this was the case during the 1945–1949 revolution.33 
During Indonesia’s revolution, the Netherlands had imposed an economic blockade 
against newly independent Indonesia. The Netherlands’ economic blockade policy was 
supported by its military operations of blockading Indonesian waters, especially at the 
Java Sea and the Malacca Straits. As a result, the Netherlands’ government limited the 
Indonesian government’s trade and economy.  
Moreover, the blockade also constrained the Indonesian military. The Netherlands 
effectively blockaded the waters surrounding Indonesia’s territory, so the Indonesian 
army lacked ammunitions and guns. As a result, the Indonesian government had to 
conduct smuggling operations through the Dutch blockade to access guns and 
ammunition from Thailand, Malaya, and Singapore’s black market.34 This experience has 
                                                 
29 It has been a customary law that the only water under national jurisdiction was the adjacent 
territorial sea, which is usually limited to three miles. 
30 J.N. Mak, “Unilateralism and Regionalism,” 141. 
31 Ibid., 140. 
32 J.E.S. Fawcett, “How Free are the Seas?” International Affairs 49, no. 1 (1973): 15. 
33 Joseph Chinyong Liow, The Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations: One Kin, Two Nations (NY: 
Routledge Curzon, 2005), 119. 
34 Roy Rowan, “Guns-Bibles-Are Smuggled to Indonesia,” Life Magazine, September 26, 1949, 49. 
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become the basis for Indonesia’s concern for its own security regarding the archipelagic 
nature of the state and will be defined later. 
In the early years of its independence, Indonesia’s maritime territorial limit was 
limited to three miles. During the transfer of independence to the Republic of the United 
States of Indonesia on 29 December 1949, the United States of the Republic of Indonesia 
agreed to retain all the legal regulations made during colonial rule, as part of the 
agreement previously made with the Netherlands.35 As a result, the Indonesian 
government maintained the Dutch Ordinance of 1939, Territoriale Zee en Maritieme 
Kringen Ordonnantie 1939 (TZMKO 1939), which limited Indonesia’s maritime 
territorial limit to three miles’ breadth. Significantly, the Dutch TZMKO 1939 limited 
Indonesian territorial waters. 
In the three miles territorial limits model, most of the Indonesian islands were 
separated by the high seas.36 That meant that any ship, whether passenger, cargo, fishing 
vessel, or even warship, was free to sail through the archipelago, as it was international 
waters.37 Having learned from experience during the revolution, the Indonesian 
government was highly concerned that the presence of high seas between its islands 
posed a threat for the integrity of the archipelagic state. 
This territorial model was not Indonesia’s preference. In Indonesia’s view, this 
territorial method of delimitation had constrained the central government’s effective 
control, considering each single island as a single entity, with its own territorial water. 
Therefore, in the mid-1950s, Indonesia began to formulate the archipelagic state concept, 
which in essence not only extended Indonesia’s territorial claim from three miles to 12 
                                                 
35 D.P. Djalal, “Geopolitical Concepts and Maritime Territorial Behaviour in Indonesian Foreign 
Policy” (PhD diss., Simon Fraser University, 1990), 36. 
36 Ibid., 37. 
37 John G. Butcher, “Becoming an Archipelagic State: The Juanda Declaration of 1957 and the 
‘Struggle’ to Gain International Recognition of the Archipelagic Principle,” in Indonesia beyond the 
Water’s Edge: Managing an Archipelagic State, ed. Robert Cribb and Michele Ford (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), 33. 
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miles, but also stated that all the waters surrounding the Indonesian archipelago were 
integral parts of Indonesian territory.38  
 
Figure 1.  Illustrative Map of Indonesia Territorial Based on the TZMKO 
1939.39 
1. The Archipelagic State Concept 
From 1956 through 1960, Indonesian elites started to connect the maritime 
territory with the notion of national unity. D.P. Djalal argued that it was during these 
years that the Indonesia’s geopolitical concerns over the maritime territory were 
growing.40 He also argued that this was the time when Indonesia raised concerns over 
foreign maritime passage within the archipelago.41 Indeed, Djalal refers his argument to 
the Juanda Declaration that served as ground for Indonesia’s determination to seek 
international recognition for the newly archipelagic state concept. This concept was 
proposed by Indonesia as a means of underpinning the security of the archipelagic state.  
                                                 
38 Butcher, “Becoming an Archipelagic State,” 33. 
39 Abdul Halaim Salam, et al., “Evaluasi Kebijakan Dalam Rangka Implementasi Konvensi Hukum 
Laut International (UNCLOS 1982) di Indonesia” [The Implementation of UNCLOS 1982 in Indonesia: 
Policy Evaluation,] (Departemen Kelautan dan Perikanan, Satuan Kerja Dewan Kelautan Indonesia, 2008), 
9. 
40 Djalal, “Geopolitical Concepts and Maritime Territorial Behaviour,” 34. 
41 Ibid., 35. 
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In 13 December 1957, just two months before the first UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I) at Geneva, the Indonesian government issued the Juanda 
Declaration. In essence, the declaration exchanged the colonial three miles territorial 
breadth for 12 miles, and introduced the territorial model whose outer limits 
circumscribed the archipelago. Therefore, Indonesia redefined its territorial jurisdiction:  
All the waters surrounding, between and connecting the island constituting 
the Indonesian State, regardless of their extension of breadth, are integral 
parts of the territory of the Indonesian state and, therefore, parts of the 
internal or national waters which are under the exclusive sovereignty of 
the Indonesian state.42 
The declaration no longer regarded the waters between Indonesia’s islands as high 
seas, but as integral part of Indonesian territory. Therefore, the declaration of this 
principle gained critics, especially from major maritime nations. The first and the 
strongest rejection came from the United States, which relied on assured naval mobility, 
including unimpeded transit through the Indonesian waters.43 On 3 January 1958, three 
days after Washington’s protest, Britain announced that the Indonesian declaration of 
territorial limits was invalid, and therefore not applicable to its citizens, ships, and 
airplanes.44 
Later, in the UNCLOS I, the Indonesian delegation explained its country’s 
unilateral legal action with regard to the archipelagic concept:  
Indonesia consists of some 13,000 islands scattered over a vast area. To 
threat them as separate entities each with its own territorial waters, would 
create many serious problems. Apart from the fact that the exercise of the 
state jurisdiction in such an area was a matter of great difficulty, there was 
a question of the maintenance of the communication between the 
islands.45 
                                                 
42 Liow, Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations, 118. 
43 Sora Lokita, The Role of the Archipelagic Baselines in Maritime Delimitation (New York: 
Division of Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations, 2010), 12. 
44 Djalal, “Geopolitical Concepts and Maritime Territorial Behaviour,” 64. 
45 Phiphat Tangsubkul and Frances Lai Fung-Wai, “The New Law of the Sea and Development in 
Southeast Asia,” Asian Survey 23, no. 7 (1983): 860. 
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If each of Indonesia’s component islands were to have its own territorial 
sea, the exercise of more effective control would be made extremely 
difficult. Furthermore, in the event of an outbreak of hostilities, the use of 
modern means of destruction in the interjacent waters would have a 
disastrous effect on the population of the islands and on the living 
resources of the maritime areas concerned. That is why the Indonesian 
government believes that the seas between and around the islands should 
be considered as forming a whole with the land territory, and that 
country’s territorial sea should be measured from baselines drawn between 
the outermost points of the outermost islands.46 
Responding to the Indonesia’s delegation argument, the U.S. chief delegate 
Arthur Dean argued: 
The committee should bear in mind that what ever was added to an 
individual state’s territorial waters must inevitably be subtracted from the 
high seas, the common property of all nations. For example, if islands 
were treated as an archipelago and a twelve-mile belt was drawn round the 
entire archipelago according to the formerly used by ships of all countries 
would be unilaterally claimed as territorial waters, or possibly even 
internal water. It would be a misnomer to describe such restrictions on the 
free use of the high seas as “progressive” measures. This delegation was 
ready to listen with understanding to the views of others, but hope that the 
views of the maritime powers would likewise receive full and fair 
consideration.47 
The United States’ position regarding the breadth of the territorial sea was determined by 
its consistent support of the universally recognized doctrine of the freedom of the high 
seas, no part of which could be unilaterally appropriated by any one state without the 
concurrence of the other. 
In the end, UNCLOS I failed to recognize Indonesia’s archipelagic concept. Two 
things explained why UNCLOS I did not accept the doctrine. First, Indonesia lacked 
support on its archipelago concept, especially from major maritime powers. Western 
maritime powers such as Britain, France, and the Netherlands generally supported the 
United States’ position to oppose any claims that threatened international freedom of 
                                                 
46 Tangsubkul and Frances Lai Fung-Wai, “The New Law of the Sea and Development in Southeast 
Asia,” 860. 
47 Djalal, “Geopolitical Concepts and Maritime Territorial Behaviour,” 63. 
 17 
navigation.48 Second, the only major power supporters for Indonesia’s archipelagic states 
concept were Russia and China. The support was of little value given their nonuser 
status.49  
The archipelagic concept found international challenges not only through 
diplomacy, but also military means. The United States, for instance, was not reluctant to 
demonstrate its adamant opposition to the doctrine. In 1958, the United States sent its 
naval mission to Indonesia’s waters to challenge the Juanda Declaration.50 The U.S. 
naval mission showed strong U.S. rejection to Indonesian territorial claims that would 
negatively affect the international freedom of navigation through the archipelago. 
The archipelagic concept also had domestic resentment. Some elites in Jakarta did 
not feel it worthwhile to pursue the matter any further after the rejection in UNCLOS I. 
Admiral Subijakto, then the chief of Indonesian Navy, contended that the archipelagic 
doctrine was an “unrealistic” decision, one driven by “excessive political emotions.”51 
He also argued that the Indonesian Navy was incapable of guarding the newly declared 
boundary due to its limited capability.52 Similarly, Foreign Minister Roeslan Abdulgani 
argued, “It was still unnecessary to commit diplomatic energy,” when confronted by 
Ambassador Subarjo Djoyoadisuryo, Indonesian chief delegate at the UNCLOS I, on the 
matter of the fate of the doctrine after the UNCLOS I rejection.53  
Despite international protests and resentment from some high-ranking Indonesian 
officials, the archipelagic state doctrine was codified as Indonesian law on 18 February 
                                                 
48 Djalal, “Geopolitical Concepts and Maritime Territorial Behaviour,” 64. 
49 Ibid., 96. 
50 Ibid., 97. 
51 Ibid., 65. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid., 67. 
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1960, just one month before the UNCLOS II was held.54 The doctrine became legal with 
the enactment of Act No. 4 regarding Indonesian waters. This move became an important 
milestone for the Indonesian archipelagic principle, as the decree had declared the 
extension of the breadth of Indonesia’s territorial waters from the customary three miles 
to 12 miles and the adoption of the concept of the archipelagic state.55   
The implication of the bill was significant to Indonesia’s territorial claim. First, 
the bill expanded Indonesia’s overall territory by 2.5-fold from 2,027,087 to 5,193,250 sq 
km.56 Second, Indonesia asserted its sovereignty within the 12-miles territorial waters 
breadth, measured from the newly formed archipelagic straight baseline that connects the 
outermost point of the outermost islands; moreover, all waters enclosed by the 
archipelagic baseline would then be regarded as internal waters, which would enjoy land 
status, where Indonesian law would apply.57 Therefore, Indonesia would be able to take 
measures to police the waters.  
Interestingly, although the primary purpose of Act No. 4 was delimiting the 
boundary of Indonesian waters, the map included Irian Jaya as part of Indonesia’s 
territory (see Figure 2).58 D.P. Djalal argued that the proponent of the Juanda declaration 
might have used the Irian Jaya issues and the threats emerged from the presence of the 
Netherlands’ navy within Indonesian archipelagic waters as a pressure for codification of 
the archipelago concept.59 Therefore, the Irian Jaya issue is worthy of consideration as an 
intervening factor of the development of Indonesia’s archipelagic state concept.  
                                                 
54 UNCLOS II was conducted from March 17 to April 26, 1960. During the conference, Indonesia and 
the Philippines raised the question of the archipelagos again, but as in UNCLOS I, the concept of 
archipelagic states again did not find ground among the participants of the conference. Therefore, the 
conference again ended without agreement on the matter. See Phiphat Tangsubkul, ASEAN and the Law of 
the Sea (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982), 10; and Lokita, Role of the Archipelagic 
Baselines, 14. 
55 Liow, Politics of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations, 118. 
56 Global Security, “Wawasan Nusantara [Archipelagic concept],” February 4, 2015, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/indonesia/archipelagic-concept.htm.  
57 Mak, “Unilateralism and Regionalism,” 141. 
58 West Irian was not part of the territory transferred to Indonesia in the 1949 agreement. 
59 Djalal, “Geopolitical Concepts and Maritime Territorial Behaviour,” 72. 
 19 
The relationship between Indonesia and the Netherlands was deteriorating over 
the issue of Irian Jaya. The Netherlands started a process of military buildup in Irian Jaya 
in mid-1960. On 17 August 1960, the Indonesian government broke off diplomatic 
relations with the Netherlands to show its rejection of its move. In March 1961, Indonesia 
even closed its indirect communication with the Netherlands.60 Later, in 1962, Indonesia 
enacted the Act of Innocent Passage61 shortly after the Dutch Navy destroyed RI Macan 
Tutul—an Indonesian navy Motor Torpedo Boat (MTB)—near the island of Aru, 
claiming 11 crew members including the navy’s deputy-chief commodore Yos Sudarso.62 
Therefore, Indonesia may have bolstered its archipelagic states concept as a manifestation 
of its security concern against foreign military presence in the archipelago waters, 
especially against the Netherlands’ military buildup in Irian Jaya. 
 
Figure 2.  Map of Indonesia Territory Based on Act No. 4/1960 Concerning 
Indonesian Waters (with 12 Miles Territorial Waters Breadth).63 
                                                 
60 Arend Lijphart, “The Indonesian Image of West Irian,” Asian Survey 1, no. 5 (1961): 9. 
61 “Innocent Passage” differs from the principle of “navigational freedom.” The “Innocent Passage” 
principle prohibited foreign ships to “stop, anchor and/or sailing back and forth without valid cause” on 
Indonesian waters. 
62 Djalal, “Geopolitical Concepts and Maritime Territorial Behaviour,” 88. 
63 Salam et al., “Evaluasi Kebijakan” [Policy Evaluation,] 10. 
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2. The Wawasan Nusantara Concept 
The Wawasan Nusantara is an important concept for understanding Indonesia’s 
view on its sovereignty. The concept was introduced by the Indonesian military in 
November 1966, just eight months after the de facto transfer of power from Sukarno to 
Suharto, in a seminar held by the Department of Defense and Security (DEPHANKAM). 
Later, in early 1972, the Institute of National Defense (LEMHANAS) revised this 
concept, and then completed the final draft of the revised Wawasan Nusantara on 10 
November 1972. The draft was then ratified and incorporated into the National Policy 
Guidelines, a five-year policy manual for the government.64  
There is a significant difference between those two concepts. The archipelagic 
state concept was emphasized by territorial delimitation. It changed the territorial limits 
from three miles to 12; it also introduced archipelagic state concept, which claims waters 
between the archipelagos as part of the territorial jurisdiction of the archipelagic state. 
Conversely, the Wawasan Nusantara itself is defined as the outlook of the Indonesian 
nation toward its people, and its territory as a political, social, economy, cultural, defense, 
and security unity. It involves a broader dimension of social and political aspect. 
Therefore, the Wawasan Nusantara concept stemmed from geopolitical concerns rather 
than merely territorial concerns. 
There are two geopolitical catalysts of the Wawasan Nusantara concept. First, 
Indonesian elites, especially military elites, started to realize that Indonesia needed a new 
doctrine to integrate its land, waters, and populations into a single entity.65 
Geographically, Indonesia is the world’s largest archipelago, which comprises thousands 
of islands, structured into five major islands and 30 sub-archipelagos; out of its 13,677 
registered islands, only 6,000 of these are inhabited.66 To Indonesia, the archipelagic 
concept or Wawasan Nusantara considers the seas as the glue of the islands, which 
                                                 
64 Djalal, “Geopolitical Concepts and Maritime Territorial Behaviour,” 110. 
65 After Suharto came to power, military elites continued to direct, substantially but not absolutely, the 
course of Indonesia’s domestic and external politics. See Djalal, “Geopolitical Concepts and Maritime 
Territorial Behaviour,” 100. 
66 Djalal, “Geopolitical Concepts and Maritime Territorial Behaviour,” 37. 
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means that the seas and the straits must be used to bridge the physical separation between 
the islands, regions, and the manifold ethnic groups. “That is to say, they are parts of a 
whole.”67  
Second, Indonesia’s geographical position has placed it in an advantageous 
position. Indonesian elites are long accustomed to the notion of posisi-silang (crossroad 
position), which referred to Indonesia’s geographical position between the Indian Ocean 
and the Pacific Ocean, and between the Asian and the Australian continents. On one side, 
Suharto himself argued that Indonesia was in a strategic position that would benefit the 
country. This view was supported by military elites who believed Indonesia’s strategic 
position benefited Indonesia in gaining influence and effective roles in regional and 
international politics.68 
Conversely, the fact that Indonesia lies in this crossroad location also placed 
Indonesia in a vulnerable position. Indonesian nationalists were wary over Indonesia’s 
strategic position. Mohammad Hatta, a prominent Indonesian leader who conceived the 
Indonesian bebas-aktif policy, contended that “Indonesia is bounded by the British navy 
and the American navy, which control the Indian and Pacific Ocean.”69 Similarly, 
General Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo argued: 
Because of its strategic location, as a crossroad between continents and 
oceans, Indonesia has been an avenue for several movements all along 
man’s history. The last important movement the world has seen was the 
Japanese movements in its offensive towards Australia in the Second 
World War, and afterwards the movements of the Allied Forces under 
General Douglas McArthur in its counter-offensive against Japan. Both 
movements were obligated to go through Indonesian territory and have 
taken Indonesia through the troubles of war.70 
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Therefore, the Wawasan Nusantara concept has leveraged the archipelagic state doctrine 
into a geopolitical concept. As a result, Indonesia asserted that it required effective 
control over this intersection, especially the maritime waterways.71 
3. Indonesia and Malaysia Agreement in the Malacca Straits 
Indonesia and Malaysia have concluded three agreements related to the 
demarcation of their maritime boundaries. The first was an agreement relating to the 
delimitation of continental shelf boundaries; made on 27 October 1969: it delimited the 
Indonesia-Malaysia continental shelf boundaries in the Straits of Malacca. The 
Indonesian government then enacted Presidential Decree No. 86/1969 to ratify the 
treaty.72  
The second agreement delimited the territorial sea. In August 1969, following 
Indonesia’s moves in the 1960s, Malaysia had extended its territorial sea from the 
traditional three to 12 miles to conform to Indonesia’s territorial sea limits.73 This move 
caused some overlapping claims with Indonesia at some narrower points in the Malacca 
Straits, which had a breadth of less than 24 NM. Therefore, Jakarta invited Kuala Lumpur 
to discuss the matter in February and March 1970. At the end of the meeting, those two 
countries found common ground that in an area where the width of the Strait is less than 
24 NM, the boundaries of the two states would be fixed at the median line between the 
outermost points on each side of the islands.74 The agreement was signed in Kuala 
Lumpur on 17 March 1970 and ratified by Law No. 2/1971.75  
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The third agreement was a trilateral agreement between Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Thailand, regarding the continental shelf boundaries in the northern part of the Malacca 
Straits. It was signed in Kuala Lumpur on 21 December 1971 and ratified by Presidential 
Decree No. 20/1972.76 This agreement has completed the agreement made between the 
Indonesian and Malaysian governments over the continental shelf in the Straits of 
Malacca. Therefore, as a result of these agreements, the territorial boundary between 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, in the Straits of Malacca has been considered clear 
and legally effective. 
Moreover, as a result of those agreements, Indonesia has a strong alliance to 
preserve its territorial claims in the Malacca Straits. In fact, on 16 November 1971, the 
Indonesian and Malaysian governments moved forward by jointly declaring that the 
Straits of Malacca and the Straits of Singapore were not international straits.77 Singapore 
was involved in this meeting; however, diplomatically, Singapore only took note of 
Indonesia and Malaysia’s position. Although Singapore did not give support to 
Indonesian and Malaysian claims in the Malacca Straits, the three countries agreed on the 
following declaration:  
• The safety of navigation through the Malacca Straits was the responsibility 
of the three coastal countries and required the cooperation of the three 
nations. 
• To arrive at the fullest cooperation, the states concerned would create a 
coordinating body consisting only of the three coastal countries. 
• Safety of navigation and internationalization of the Straits would be 
considered as two separate issues.78 
4. The UNCLOS III 
Finally, the UNCLOS III accommodated the archipelagic state concept. The Law 
of the Sea (LOSC) clearly defined the terms of archipelagic states within its provision 
part IV, Article 46:  
                                                 
76 Oegroseno, “Indonesia’s Maritime Boundaries,” 55. 
77 Michael Leifer and Dolliver Nelson, “Conflict of Interest in the Straits of Malacca,” International 
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• “archipelagic states” means a state constituted wholly by one or more 
archipelagos and may include other islands; 
• “archipelago” means a group of islands, including parts of islands, 
interconnecting waters and other natural features which are so closely 
interrelated that such islands, waters and other natural features form an 
intrinsic geographical, economic and political entity, or which historically 
have been regarded as such.79 
Once the archipelagic baseline has been drawn, an archipelagic state enjoys two 
distinctive rights: first, the entitlement to use the archipelagic baseline for delimiting 
adjacent maritime zones. This right gives archipelagic states the ability to assert claims to 
a territorial sea, contiguous zone, Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and continental shelf 
over the area of ocean previously considered as high seas (map of Indonesia territory and 
EEZ provided in Figure 3). Second, the entitlement that the waters that fall within the 
archipelagic baselines are considered as archipelagic waters over which the archipelagic 
state is able to exercise its sovereignty not only in the waters, but also to the airspace and 
the seabed.80 Indeed, Article 34 of the UNCLOS 1982 clearly provides the special 
entitlement for states bordering the straits used for international navigation to claim it 
sovereignty over the water, seabed, and air space.81 The UNCLOS’ acknowledgements 
of the archipelagic concept have bolstered Indonesia’s assertiveness over its territorial 
claim in the Malacca Straits.  
                                                 
79 The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 
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Figure 3.  Illustrative Map of Indonesia Territorial and Exclusive Economy 
Zone (EEZ)82 
C. INTERNATIONAL CHALLENGES TO TERRITORIAL CLAIMS IN THE 
STRAITS 
The Malacca Straits’ position between the Indian Ocean and South China Sea has 
been strategically important as waterways linking those two oceans. Geographically, the 
Malacca Straits that consist of the Straits of Malacca and the Straits of Singapore are 
stretched along 600 NM from northwest to southeast between the coastline of Thailand, 
Malaysia, and Singapore, to the east and Indonesia’s island of Sumatra, to the west.83 
The Malacca Straits varies in width from 126 NM in the northern entrance, narrowing 
down to 7.8 NM at the One-Fathom Bank near Kukup, in the Malaysian State of Johor.84  
The Malacca Straits have long become the major sea-lanes for trading between 
the East and the West. The straits have been used for transferring goods and oil back and 
forth throughout the entire region in Asia and the Middle East. In 2003, more than 50,000 
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vessels passed through the Straits, carrying more than one-third of global trade.85 The 
straits also have become the artery for the world’s oil and gas, raw materials, and natural 
resources. In terms of energy transport, more than two-thirds of world’s oil and gas flow 
through this strait. Most of the oil from Persian Gulf producers is transported to China, 
Japan, and Korea through the Malacca Straits.86 In 2003, 11 million barrels of oil were 
transported through the straits each day.87 Japan alone receives 80% of its oil from ships 
transiting the straits.88 The safety and security of the straits is crucial to maintain the 
massive flow of those goods and oil to Asian continent. 
The Malacca Straits’ strategic position is not only important for trade and the flow 
of oil and gas, but also strategically important for naval mobility; see map in Figure 4. 
For instance, in December 1971, during the Indo-Pakistani crisis, the U.S. aircraft carrier 
USS Enterprise and a squadron of Soviet Navy ships passed through the straits to the 
Indian Ocean. In July 1976, a U.S. aircraft carrier again sailed through the straits heading 
for east Africa in response to a crisis in Uganda.89 Therefore, the Malacca Straits also has 
been of high military value. 
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Figure 4.  The Malacca Straits (The Strait of Malacca and the Strait of 
Singapore).90 
1. Japan’s Responses to Territorial Claims in the Straits 
Japan has concerns to the Malacca Straits, especially regarding its energy 
security. Japan is heavily dependent on the Straits of Malacca as the primary sea-lanes of 
communication (SLOC) for their energy supplies from the Gulf; in fact, in the early of 
1970s, it was estimated that 90% of Japan’s oil, imported from Middle East, was shipped 
via the Malacca Straits.91 Therefore, regarding the importance of the straits for Japan, it 
is understandable that Japan has enduring concerns on the security in the Malacca Straits. 
Furthermore, Japan also has a continuing concern about management and safety 
in the Malacca Straits. In 1967, Japan took its first initiative on navigational safety when 
it proposed the establishment of sea-lanes in the Malacca Straits to the London-based 
Sub-Committee on the Safety of Navigation of the Inter-Governmental Maritime 
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Consultative Organization (IMCO).92 The three littoral countries accepted Japan’s 
initiative and allowed Japan to conduct a preliminary survey in March 1969. After the 
completion of the preliminary survey, in 1970, Japan had announced a plan to launch a 
full-scale survey. In August 1969, however, Malaysia declared its 12 NM territorial water 
breadth and asked Japan to recognize its territorial waters as a precondition for Japan to 
conduct the full-scale hydrographic survey. The Japanese refused to do so; Japan insisted 
that the Malacca Straits was an international strait.93 Therefore, Japan’s interest in 
navigational safety in the straits clashed with Indonesia and Malaysia’s territorial claims. 
The tension between Japan and the littoral states again came to the fore after 
Japan proposed a draft for the establishment of a “Malacca-Singapore Straits Board” to 
the International Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), in an effort to 
internationalize the safety management of the straits.94 As a result, in the 1971 joint 
agreement, Indonesia and Malaysia openly declared that the management and the safety 
of the Malacca Straits was the sole prerogative of the littoral states, and any attempt to 
internationalize the straits was “totally out of the question.”95 In response to that 
agreement, Japan, however, agreed to work closely with the littoral states to complete the 
planned hydrographic survey without any more setbacks.96 Therefore, having learned 
from all of these experiences, Indonesia logically is cautious about Japan’s enduring 
efforts to internationalize the Malacca Straits. 
2. U.S. Responses to Territorial Claims in the Straits 
There was a divergence of opinion within the U.S. bureaucracy over territorial 
claims in the Malacca Straits. At the beginning, after the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore 
joint statement in 1971, the United States did not express its position over Indonesia and 
Malaysia’s claims, but strongly emphasized the importance of freedom of navigation in 
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the straits.97 Later, the United States showed its position over the issue, but there were 
different point of views between the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and the U.S. 
State Department. The DOD was more concerned with the implications for the U.S. 
strategic interests in the straits, while the State Department was concerned with the issue 
within the wider frame of U.S. relations with the non-Communist countries in Southeast 
Asia.98 Both of these views may have influenced the U.S. responses to Indonesia’s 
claims. 
The DOD concern over the strategic value of the Straits was represented by 
Admiral Moorer, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who said, “The United 
States feels we should have and must have freedom to go through, under, and over the 
Malacca Straits.”99 Vertzberger argues that the DOD concerns stemmed from the U.S. 
experience during the 1971 Bangladesh Crisis.100  
During the 1971 Bangladesh Crisis, being conscious of the movement of foreign 
naval vessels in the Malacca Straits, Indonesia and Malaysia decided that the foreign 
warships should give prior notice to the coastal states before transiting the straits. Jakarta 
and Kuala Lumpur reportedly even had intentionally expressed verbal threats to any 
foreign naval vessel entering the straits without prior notice.101 The Indonesian military 
said that this condition would be applied especially to those countries that were not 
adjacent to the Indian Ocean because their purposes for sending warships through the 
Malacca Straits were dubious. However, the Indonesian foreign minister declared that the 
obligation of prior notification would apply to every country without exception.102 
Despite the verbal threat, the Indonesian government never used its military force to 
interfere with international navigation in the Malacca Straits. For example, during that 
period, the passage of the USS Enterprise received no Indonesian military reaction 
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whatsoever. Djalal argued that “… the threats appears to be a response to a rumour which 
was widely-spread at that time regarding the sighting of Soviet submarines near the 
country’s shores, allegedly to help political prisoners escape.”103 Therefore, it is 
considered that Indonesia’s geopolitical considerations had driven the threats rather than 
military concerns. 
Despite its strong rejection of territorial claims in the straits, the United States 
willingly acknowledged Indonesia and Malaysia’s claims as long as both countries 
agreed to preserve freedom of navigation in the Malacca Straits. The U.S. Department of 
State through the U.S. representative to the United Nations Committee on Peaceful Uses 
of the Seabed declared the United States’ readiness to accept the principle of 12 NM 
territorial seas, even for the international straits, as long as the littoral states keep the right 
of free transit for international uses of the straits. Moreover, the United States accepted, 
though not publicly, the demand of the littoral states for securing prior notification of the 
passage of U.S. naval vessels.104  
3. Singapore’s Responses to Territorial Claims in the Straits 
Singapore rejected any territorial claims in the straits. Despite being party to the 
1971 joint agreement, Singapore only took note of Indonesia and Malaysia’s efforts in 
claiming territorial waters in the straits.105 Singapore is highly dependent on the open 
access of maritime traffic of the Malacca Straits to its harbor. Any attempt to restrict 
traffic would hamper Singaporean interests. Singapore’s Foreign Minister S. Rajaratnam 
declared before parliament that Singapore stood “for the unimpeded passage of all ships 
of all nations through the straits.”106 Therefore, Singapore valued the freedom of 
navigation in the straits, instead of territorial claims that could hamper its national 
interest.  
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After the 1971 joint agreement, a clash of interest between Singapore and the 
other two littoral states emerged over the Under Keel Clearance (UKC) issues. Indonesia 
and Malaysia suggested firmly that any tanker of more than 200,000 Dead Weight 
Tonnage (DWT) should not be allowed to pass through the Malacca Straits and should be 
re-routed through the Lombok-Makassar Straits.107 Singapore opposed this idea and 
argued that 2.6 meters UKC was adequate, whereas Indonesia demanded 4.6 meters 
UKC.  
For Indonesia and Malaysia, regulating shipping became more urgent after several 
incidents happened in the other world’s busy straits, for instance, the grounding of the 
Torrey Canyon off the English coast in March 1967.108 On 6 January 1975, a Japanese 
237,000-ton super tanker Showa Maru ran aground in the Singapore Straits and spilled 
almost one million gallons of crude oil into the straits.109 One year later, in 1976, the 
52,000 DWT tanker Diego Silang collided with two other vessels off Batu Pahat, south of 
One-Fathom Bank.110 Singapore, however, argued that Indonesia’s demand for 4.6 
meters of UKC was an Indonesian-Malaysian plot to weaken Singapore’s economy under 
the guise of promoting environmental control.111 
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter states that Indonesia’s territorial claim at the Malacca Straits has its 
roots in the declaration of the archipelagic state concept. The declaration in essence not 
only extended Indonesia’s territorial claim from three miles to 12 miles, but also 
promoted that all the waters surrounding the Indonesian archipelago are integral parts of 
Indonesian territory. Therefore, Indonesia insists that the Malacca Straits is included 
within its territorial waters. Additionally, the agreement between Indonesia and Malaysia 
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on the delimitation of territorial waters and continental shelf has strengthened Indonesia’s 
assertiveness over territorial claims in the Malacca Straits. Since then, Indonesia has had 
a strong alliance regarding claims on territorial waters in the straits. Therefore, on 16 
November 1971, Indonesia and Malaysia made a declaration that the Malacca Straits was 
not international waterways. In the end, Indonesia gained international recognition of its 
status as an archipelagic state through the adoption of the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Conversely, the major maritime countries 
such as the United States and Japan reject any territorial claims on the straits.  
The major maritime powers asserted that the Malacca Straits’ status was that of 
international straits. Therefore, the management of the safety and the security in the 
straits should not be surrendered to the littoral states alone. In this context, Japan had 
proposed to internationalize the safety of navigation in the straits. In 1967, for instance, 
Japan proposed the establishment of Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) to the London-
based Sub-Committee on the Safety of Navigation of the Inter-Governmental Maritime 
Consultative Organization (IMCO). Japan also rejected any territorial claims in the 
straits. On the other hand, the United States, even though it did not ratify the UNCLOS 
1982, was ready to recognize the 12 miles territorial claims, including in the international 
straits, as long as the littoral states preserved the right of free transit for international uses 
of the straits. Therefore, these conflicting interests have bolstered Indonesia’s sensitivity 
about its sovereignty in the Malacca Straits. 
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III. INDONESIAN PREFERENCE FOR REGIONAL 
COOPERATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter II has explained that the competing interests between Indonesia and user 
states have bolstered Indonesia’s sensitivity about its sovereignty in the Malacca Straits. 
However, despite its sensitivity, Indonesia welcomes and participates in regional 
maritime security initiatives. Therefore, this chapter examines why Indonesia, especially 
when regarding the security issues in the region, has a preference to cooperate with other 
ASEAN members, instead of with extraregional powers. This chapter argues that 
Indonesia’s preference derives from its assertiveness that domestic and regional 
resilience, instead of dependence on external powers, would be the best tool to maintain 
security and stability in the region. Therefore, Indonesia considered that the security in 
the Malacca Straits would be better served through regional security cooperation. 
To explain the phenomenon, this chapter is divided into three sections. The first 
section addresses the root of Indonesia’s opposition against foreign intervention in the 
regional security issue. This section reviews Indonesia’s bebas-aktif (independent and 
active) foreign policy, commitment to the nonalignment movement (NAM), and 
opposition to military pacts. The second section addresses Indonesia’s regional activism. 
This section reviews the establishment of ASEAN, the ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace, 
Freedom, and Neutrality), the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), and the 
promotion of the regional resilience concept. The third section examines regional 
initiatives on maritime security cooperation in the Malacca Straits prior to 2004. For that 
purpose, this section reviews the INDOSIN and the MALINDO coordinated patrol in the 
straits.  
B. THE ROOT OF INDONESIA’S OPPOSITION AGAINST FOREIGN 
INTERVENTION IN REGIONAL SECURITY  
This section argues that Indonesia’s rejection of the involvement of extraregional 
powers in the management of security in the region stemmed from its own experience 
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during the period of national revolution (1945–1948). During that period, Indonesia had 
experienced a lack of sympathy and support from the world’s major powers such the 
United States, Britain, France, and Soviet Union for its independence. Indonesian 
nationalists felt that the major powers had not given Indonesia clear backing against 
colonialism.112 This feeling became worse as the British accommodated and facilitated 
the return of the Dutch military to Indonesia after the end of World War II.  
These first impressions in the early years of its independence had a tremendous 
impact on Indonesian foreign policy. The reluctance of the world’s major power to order 
the Dutch to withdraw from Indonesia had caused huge disappointment among 
Indonesian leaders and had undermined their initial expectations that the major powers 
would support national self-determination for Indonesia.113 Therefore, many Indonesians 
believed that Western powers would always try to weaken Indonesia. Many elites were 
also suspicious that colonialism might return in a new form.114 As a result, these 
experiences have strengthened the conviction of the nationalists that Indonesia should 
remain independent, free from foreign intervention.115 Hence, to explore this 
phenomenon, this section examines Indonesia bebas-aktif (independent and active) 
policy, Indonesian commitment to the nonalignment movement (NAM), and Indonesia’s 
opposition to military pacts. 
1. The Bebas-Aktif (Independent-Active) Policy. 
In the late 1940s, at the height of the Cold War, Indonesia decided not to take 
sides with either the East or theW. The Indonesian commitment to avoid close relations 
with one particular external power was institutionalized in the bebas-aktif (independent-
active) foreign policy principle conceived on September 2, 1948. Bebas (independent) 
means that Indonesia is free from polarization and is not involved in any military pacts; 
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aktif (active) means that Indonesia will be actively involved in efforts to maintain world 
peace and security.116 The bebas-aktif policy stemmed from Hatta’s idea of depicted 
Indonesia foreign policy as rowing between two reefs (mendayung diantara dua 
karang).117 Hatta believed that Indonesia should navigate between two opposition blocs 
led by the United States and the Soviet Union and not align itself with one of the blocs.  
The bebas-aktif policy caused the Indonesian government to become quite careful 
about signing any international agreements that would link Indonesia to one bloc. For 
instance, during the early 1950s, the narrow interpretation of the bebas-aktif policy 
required the government to refrain from engaging in any international agreements that 
would have “the effect of committing Indonesia to one of the Cold War protagonists.”118 
As a result of that interpretation, during early 1952, Foreign Minister Subardjo faced a 
storm of protest from the Indonesian public after he had won U.S. economic aid by 
promising the United States that Indonesia would support America in establishing the 
“free world.”119 Therefore, this policy was not easy to be implemented, especially when 
Indonesia desperately needed foreign assistance and aid. 
Later in the middle 1950s, Ali Sastroamidjojo’s cabinet had broadened the 
definition of bebas-aktif policy. He shifted the original interpretation to not only avoid a 
formal commitment to one bloc, but also played a reasonable balance between the two 
blocs.120 Such an approach made Indonesia prefer bilateral relations with other countries, 
either from the Western or from the Eastern bloc. In fact, in addition to its relations with 
the West, Indonesia started to establish relations with communist countries which had 
been well established since the early 1950s. For instance, Indonesia signed its first trade 
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agreement with China in 1953.121 Furthermore, in 1954, Indonesia established diplomatic 
relations with the Soviet Union and other communist countries.122 Later, this broadened 
definition of bebas-aktif policy would drive Indonesia nationalists into the Nonalignment 
Movement (NAM) in 1955. 
2. Commitment to Nonalignment Movement (NAM). 
Indonesia was actively involved in the creation of the nonalignment movement 
(NAM) organization and became the host of the first conference. The NAM was created 
in 1955 during the collapse of the colonial system, in the periods of widespread struggle 
of Asia, Africa, and Latin America for independence and self-determination at the height 
of the Cold War.123 Bandung’s Asian-African Conference, held in Bandung, on 18–24 
April 1955, had paved the way for the Nonalignment Movement.124 The 29 heads of the 
newly independent Asian and African states attended the Bandung conference to discuss 
and identify world issues post–World War II and to define international relations to 
address those issues.125 This event enhanced Indonesia’s role in international politics, 
especially among the Asian-Africa countries. 
In its development, the NAM not only addressed the self-determination of Asian 
and Africa countries, but also rejected military alliances either with the West or the East. 
At the beginning of its establishment, NAM’s purpose was to support member countries’ 
independence and self-determination.126 Additionally, the NAM also promoted the idea 
to resist apartheid, colonialism, and military alignment.127 Furthermore, the principles of 
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NAM prevented its members from becoming members of a multilateral military 
alliance.128 The principle also rejected the provision of military bases for foreign military 
powers in the context of Great Power conflicts.129 Therefore, NAM’s members avoided 
affiliation either with the West or the East during the Cold War periods. 
The spirit of the nonalignment movement preoccupied the Indonesian people. 
Sukarno played an important role to promote a nonalignment spirit among Indonesia’s 
people at that time. He was one of the prominent figures supporting the establishment of 
the NAM. Together with the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Gamal Abdel 
Nasser; the President of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah; the Prime Minister of India, 
Jawaharlal Nehru; and the President of Yugoslavia, Joseph Broz Tito would form and be 
the founding fathers of the Nonalignment Movement.130 Robert Niebuhr argued that 
leaders such as Sukarno actually used the issue of the nonalignment movement as tools in 
their foreign policy to win domestic legitimacy.131  
The other factor that might contribute to the popularity of the Nonalignment 
Movement (NAM) among the Indonesian people was that the NAM matched 
Indonesian’s revolutionary spirit. NAM provided hope, pride, and self-confidence to the 
Indonesian people after the disappointment over the lack of support from Western powers 
for Indonesia’s struggle for independence. Moreover, the Indonesian leaders also 
believed that the decision to join the NAM was in accordance with the principles in the 
preamble of the 1945 Decree to promote world peace and justice.132 Therefore, the NAM 
concept easily found support in Indonesia. 
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3. Opposition to Military Pacts 
The bitter past experiences during the revolutionary days has bolstered Indonesia 
in rejecting any external intervention in its domestic affairs and prefers to promote 
intermural cooperation in the region instead of dependence on external powers.133 Hence, 
Indonesia opposed any military pact in the region and asked its neighbors to take 
responsibility for the management of security in the region, rather than to rely on 
extraregional powers or multilateral military pacts.134  
On the other hand, the bebas-aktif foreign policy was continuing to evolve. By 
1965, the definition of the bebas (independent) policy once again evolved to be 
interpreted as a condition of freedom from any “dependence on imperialism.”135 As a 
result, the aktif (active) policy was then understood to mean that Indonesia had to take a 
leading role in the region and the international arena against imperialism and 
colonialism.136 Going further, in January 1965, Sukarno denounced the United Nations 
(UN) as imperialist-dominated and withdrew Indonesia from its membership.137 
Therefore, the new interpretation of the bebas-aktif foreign policy strengthened Indonesia 
opposition to military pacts. 
When Suharto took office in 1966, he made significant changes about Indonesia’s 
relations toward the West. Indeed, Suharto showed a different attitude toward the 
presence of Western powers in the region. He does not seem to regard the presence of 
Western powers as a direct threat against Indonesia.138 Sukarno’s total opposition to any 
foreign presence was replaced with a moderate and pragmatic position.139 Moreover, 
during the early years of Suharto’s presidency, he restored Indonesia’s membership in the 
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UN and suspended Indonesia’s relations with Russia and China.140 As a result, a regime 
change in Jakarta successfully altered Indonesia’s preference toward Western countries 
Even though Indonesia’s dependence on the West has become greater than before, 
especially in economics, aid, and investment, Indonesia’s elites rejected the alliance 
system in the region.141 Suharto’s administration, however, returned the interpretation of 
bebas-aktif (independent-active) policy’s definition to the ‘no pacts’ interpretation of 
early 1950s. He believed that military pacts were not an effective form of defense in the 
region.142 Therefore, under Suharto’s administration, Indonesia continued to reject 
military pacts. 
C. INDONESIA’S REGIONAL ACTIVISM 
In 1967, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand formed 
ASEAN. The creation of ASEAN was largely to serve its five original members’ vision 
to create a mechanism that could contribute to peace and stability in the regional 
relations. In the context of Indonesian interests, M.H. Wirajuda argues that the ASEAN is 
important not only to avoid conflict and foreign intervention in the region, but also to 
restore and preserve Indonesia’s international and regional credibility.143 According to 
Michael Leifer, the Suharto administration regards ASEAN not merely as a forum that 
would accommodate its interests, but also “as the vehicle through which a willing 
acceptance of Indonesia’s political primacy in Southeast Asia may be facilitated.”144 
Therefore, ASEAN has an important value for Indonesia. 
Although Suharto built a low-profile image in its relations with other ASEAN 
counterparts, Indonesia continued its regional activism. In fact, Suharto promoted a 
regional security concept that was derived from Indonesia’s domestic concept of 
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Ketahanan-Nasional (National Resilience).145 Therefore, to understand Indonesia’s 
preference for regional cooperation, this section explores how the establishment of 
ASEAN has rehabilitated Indonesia’s relation with its neighbors, especially with 
Malaysia. This section also explores how ASEAN has been considered successful in 
channeling Indonesia’s concept of national resilience at the regional level to support 
Indonesian foreign policy. 
1. The Establishment of ASEAN 
Prior to the establishment of ASEAN in 1967, some earlier attempts were made to 
create a regional association in Southeast Asia. The most significant, however, was the 
establishment of the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA). ASA was established in July 
1961; the member states included the former Federation of Malaya, the Philippines, and 
Thailand.146 The ASA, however, had collapsed over the Philippines and Malaysia’s 
dispute over North Borneo (Sabah), which centered on the fact that the British 
Administration, upon withdrawal from North Borneo (Sabah), had attributed jurisdiction 
of the territory to Malaysia.147 In response to the British plan, in July 1963, the 
Philippines renewed its claim to North Borneo (Sabah). The Philippines believed that the 
expansion of the Federation of Malaya was a British strategy to maintain its influence in 
the region.148  
At the same time, Indonesia’s confrontation campaign against Malaysia also 
contributed to paralyzing the ASA. Indonesia also had resentment over the establishment 
of Malaysia; Sukarno perceived it as a British move to maintain its influence in the 
region. Indonesia, however, launched limited military actions against Malaysian borders 
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in Borneo.149 The stalemate in ASA lasted for almost three years until Indonesia changed 
its policies toward Malaysia in 1966.  
Regime changes from Sukarno to Suharto would later change Indonesian policy 
toward Malaysia. One year after the failed coup attempt, on March 1966, Suharto had 
secured power de facto from Sukarno through the controversial “Supersemar”—Surat 
Perintah Sebelas Maret (Eleven March Order), a mandate from Sukarno that gave 
Suharto authority to take necessary measures to restore Indonesian stability—Later, on 12 
March 1967, Suharto was formally inaugurated as the Indonesian President by the MPRS 
(Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Semesta, the Temporary People’s Consultative 
Assembly).150 After the de facto transferring of authority, Suharto asserted that Indonesia 
needed to stabilize its regional relations, especially toward Malaysia.151 Suharto then 
took an important measure to rehabilitate Indonesia-Malaysia relations. Hence, on August 
1966, Indonesia and Malaysia signed a peace agreement in Jakarta.152 Therefore, this 
agreement formally ended the Indonesia-Malaysia conflict. 
The ending of conflict between Indonesia and Malaysian had brought an 
opportunity for the establishment of another organization for regional cooperation in the 
region. In short time, on August 1967, the Bangkok Declaration gave birth to ASEAN, 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, whose members include Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. This organization was considered more 
likely to be an organization similar to the European Union that heavily relies on 
economic relations rather than military cooperation.153 Indonesia was pleased with the 
kind of cooperation. 
Scholars argue that the ASEAN could serve several Indonesia interests. Shaun 
Narine argues that ASEAN could remove the latent tension between Indonesia and 
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Malaysia left over from the confrontation policy. Indonesia was aware that even though 
the de facto regime change in Jakarta in 1966 successfully ended the konfrontasi, the 
regional tensions remained high. Moreover, Narine also believed that ASEAN would 
benefit for economic development in the member states, including Indonesia. At the end, 
the economic benefit would contribute to political stability by enhancing domestic social 
conditions. Additionally, he argues that by promoting internal security, ASEAN 
members, including Indonesia, will be less vulnerable to conflict.154 This idea supports 
Acharya’s argument that the establishment of ASEAN was diminishing the prospect of 
force being used within regional affairs of its members.155 
On the other hand, Michael Leifer contends that Indonesia tends to see ASEAN as 
an important vehicle for its foreign policy interests. Two reasons support his arguments. 
First, he argued that ASEAN is important for Indonesia to create regional security and 
stability through regional economic cooperation; thus Indonesia could channel its energy 
“to promote internal stability rather than external antagonism.”156 Indeed, Indonesia has 
experienced several domestic subversive and coup attempts since the 1950s until the mid-
1960s.157 Second, Leifer argued, “ASEAN is seen as the vehicle through which a willing 
acceptance of Indonesia’s political primacy in Southeast Asia can be facilitated.”158 
Therefore, Indonesia has considered ASEAN to be highly strategic in promoting 
Indonesia’s interests, especially regarding economy and security in regional and 
international politics. 
                                                 
154 Shaun Narine, “ASEAN and the Management of the Regional Security,” Pacific Affairs 71, no. 2 
(Summer 1998): 196. 
155 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia, 59. 
156 Michael Leifer, “Indonesia’s Future Role,” World Today 26, no. 12 (December 1970): 515. 
157 During the 1950s, several insurgencies and subversive movements attempted to disintegrate the 
provincial government from the central government in Indonesia. Those political and military actions failed 
but caused tremendous trouble for the central government. In 1965, the failed coup attempt launched by the 
Communist party caused Sukarno to step down from office. 
158 Leifer, “Indonesia’s Future Role,” 515. 
 43 
2. ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality)  
On 27 November 1971, in Kuala Lumpur, ASEAN declared Southeast Asia as a 
zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality (ZOPFAN). The declaration was considered as the 
beginning of ASEAN’s new orientation along a security dimension. Indeed, since the 
establishment of ASEAN, the member states preferred the organization “to remain safely 
on economic ground.”159 However, during the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 
1970s, most ASEAN member states considered the security dimension should not be 
excluded from the ASEAN realm.160 Therefore, the declaration of ZOPFAN became so 
important as the tool to promote ASEAN view about regional security on the 
international politics stage. 
Neutrality became the main theme of the declaration of ZOPFAN. Abad argued 
that “taken in the context of Kuala Lumpur declaration, neutrality means that the Zone 
states shall undertake to maintain their impartiality and shall refrain from involvement 
directly or indirectly, in ideological, political, and economic, armed or other forms of 
conflict, particularly between powers outside the zone, and that outside power shall not 
interfere in the domestic and regional affairs of the Zone states.”161 Hence, the 
declaration of ZOPFAN highly considered as a political move by ASEAN to resist 
external intervention in the region. 
Indeed, the issue of regional opposition to external interference has become the 
main theme since the establishment of ASEAN in 1967. The ASEAN Declaration of 
1967 articulates the security objective as follows: 
The countries of Southeast Asia share a primary responsibility for 
strengthening the economic and social stability of the region and ensuring 
their peaceful and progressive national development, and … they are 
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determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference 
in any form of manifestation.162 
Jakarta readily accepted the establishment of the Kuala Lumpur declaration of 
neutrality. Even though Indonesia has accommodated and tolerated some ASEAN 
members’ preference to maintain their special relation with extraregional powers for their 
security, Indonesia maintains an unfavorable attitude towards collective defense pacts.163 
Hence, Indonesia considered the implementation of ZOPFAN in the region has supported 
its bebas-aktif and nonalignment policy. 
3. ASEAN Way 
The “ASEAN Way” is a term favored by ASEAN’s leaders to describe the 
process of intramural interaction between member states, but the meaning of the term 
itself remains vague and contested. Indeed, the origin of the term itself is obscure. 
General Ali Murtopo, Indonesia’s senior intelligence leader, was considered as one of the 
prominent political figures who used the term for the first time. In 1974, he argued that 
ASEAN success depended on the unique system of consultation that he called as the 
‘ASEAN way’. He contended that the system has been proved effective with the 
organization and has showed that it works.164  
The ASEAN Way is a unique method of interaction and a decision-making 
process used among within ASEAN. It had two distinct features. First, the ASEAN Way 
preferred informality and a loose cooperative framework. Indeed, senior government 
officials of ASEAN member state preferred to exploit close interpersonal contacts among 
them instead of using institutional or official channels to conduct their relations.165 
Second, the concept and practice of consensus building and the avoidance of a majority 
decision-making process has characterized the ASEAN Way.166 That concept can hardly 
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be found in any other regional organizations; therefore, some scholars viewed the 
ASEAN Way as a by-product of cultural similarities among the Southeast Asia 
countries.167 
Indonesia has been familiar with the ASEAN practice of consensus building. 
Although a consensus decision-making process is common in the Southeast Asian 
culture, in an ASEAN context, the origin of the term is derived from a particular style of 
decision-making within Javanese village society.168 Moreover, the two notions 
musyawarah (consultations) and mufakat (consensus)—commonly used to describe the 
ASEAN decision-making process—were common terms in Java’s society decision-
making process. Therefore, from a psychological perspective, Indonesia was comfortable 
with the use of consultation and the consensus principal within the ASEAN decision-
making process. 
4. Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) 
The treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) provides a formal mechanism for 
ASEAN countries to conduct their relations. Specifically, the TAC provides guidelines in 
the field of conflict management, particularly in the peaceful settlement of dispute. Six 
behavior principles set forth in the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation that should 
guide ASEAN members’ relations:169 
• Mutual respect for the independent, sovereignty, equality, territorial 
integrity, and national identity of all nations 
• The right of every state to lead its national existence free from external 
interference, subversion or coercion 
• Noninterference in internal affairs of one another 
• Settlement of differences or dispute by peaceful means 
• Renunciation of the use of force  
• Effective cooperation among themselves 
Even though of the existence of TAC has provided a formal mechanism for 
dispute settlement, ASEAN countries have never used it. ASEAN has a tendency to limit 
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institutionalization, but maintains informality in their relations, especially in dispute 
settlement. Acharya argued that such behavior stemmed from proponents of the ASEAN 
Way, which asserts that the looseness and informality had created “the level of comfort” 
that benefit ASEAN members’ relation.170 
5. The Promotion of the Regional Resilience Concept 
In August 1976, President Suharto openly promoted the idea of “regional 
resilience” during his speech in front of ASEAN countries leaders in the first ASEAN 
Summit, held in Bali. The condition of “regional resilience” is said to occur when each 
ASEAN member state has succeeded in promoting its own security and prosperity by 
relying on its own “resilience,” instead of depending on external assistance.171 Basically, 
the idea was derived from Indonesian assertiveness that in resolving regional security 
issues, both at national and regional levels, ASEAN should undertake two interrelated 
approaches.172 The first approach is to let the individual country deal with nontraditional 
security problems within its country through individual nation-building measures. The 
second approach is to provide a peaceful external environment so that states could focus 
in their domestic problems.173  
Indonesia’s idea of regional resilience was derived from its national resilience 
doctrine. Indonesia’s national resilience doctrine argues that a variety of social, cultural, 
economic, political, and military issues have the potential to destabilize national security. 
Hence, national security does not depend on external alliances, but rather on the 
strengthening of internal “resilience” in all aspects of national life, such as social, 
cultural, economic, political, and military.174 Therefore, Indonesia’s proposal on 
“regional resilience” again showed Indonesia’s rejection of external intervention in the 
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regional security affairs. It also showed Indonesia’s preference for a regional security 
framework on the basis of noninterference into one domestic security issue. 
D. INDONESIAN MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE 
MALACCA STRAITS PRIOR TO 2004 
At the end of the Cold War, Indonesia’s approach toward regional security began 
to change as the growing salience of nontraditional threats forced ASEAN members to 
recognize the importance of interstate cooperation. The raising number of piracy 
incidents in the straits has raised concerns from the straits’ users. In turn, it led to an 
initiative by the private sector to establish a Piracy Reporting Center in 1992, operated by 
the International Maritime Bureau (IMB).175 Under pressure from the private sector and 
the user states on the safety and the security in the straits, some ASEAN members, 
including Indonesia, began to be more flexible about regional security cooperation to 
resolve domestic problems with cross-border effects.  
Despite the changes in Indonesia’s approach, the notion of sovereignty as the 
basis for regional cooperation and the principle of noninterference remain paramount.176 
Indonesia considered the Malacca Straits issue as a regional one. Therefore, Indonesia 
prefers to maintain the maritime security cooperation with the littoral states, instead of 
involving foreign maritime powers. Moreover, Indonesia also prefers a coordinated 
patrol–type operation rather than a joint patrol, which operates within a bilateral 
framework and is common in ASEAN interactions. Therefore, to understand how 
Indonesia cooperated with other ASEAN countries, especially in the context of the 
maritime security cooperation in the Malacca Straits after the end of the cold war, this 
section examines operational maritime security cooperation in the Malacca Straits. 
1. INDONESIA-SINGAPORE COORDINATED PATROL (ISCP) 
In June 1992, responding to the rise of armed robbery incidents in the Malacca 
Straits, Indonesia and Singapore agreed to establish a bilateral cooperation framework to 
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patrol the Straits of Singapore named Indonesia-Singapore Coordinated Patrol (ISCP) or 
simply called INDOSIN.177 Under INDOSIN, Indonesia and Singapore coordinated their 
patrolling activities, shared information and otherwise cooperated, but enforcement 
forces had to remain in their own territorial jurisdiction. Each patrol required one warship 
and one marine police vessel from both sides. The patrol program was carried out four 
times per year for 60 days, for a total of 240 days per year to maintain safety and security 
in the Strait of Singapore.178  
The INDOSIN coordinated patrol operations in the Strait of Singapore. The Strait 
of Singapore is shorter compared to the length of the Straits of Malacca. It extends 
approximately 133 km from the Strait of Malacca in the west and the South China Sea in 
the east.179 The main focus of the INDOSIN coordinated patrol was the safety and the 
security against armed robbery along the straits, especially in the anchorage area off the 
Batam, Singapore, and Bintan. The anchorage area has become the focus of the 
coordinated patrol since reports showed that most piratical incidents in the Straits of 
Singapore happened in the anchorage area. Otherwise, the coordinated patrol also took 
into account piracy incidents when ships were underway in the strait. Armed robbery 
incidents in the Straits of Singapore usually took only a short time; therefore, the 
strategies used by the enforcement vessels were to exploit unit’s high readiness, and 
information exchange. 
At the operational level, Indonesia and Singapore will host every patrol program 
alternately, but each country is responsible for its own operational costs. The two 
countries also have their own task group, which coordinated and passed information to 
their respective enforcement vessels. Indonesia’s INDOSIN task group command is 
located in the Indonesian Navy Western Fleet Sea Security, in Batam.  
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2. INDONESIA-MALAYSIA COORDINATED PATROL (IMCP) 
In the same year when Indonesia and Singapore launched INDOSIN, Indonesia 
had also established a bilateral coordinated patrol with Malaysia. The cooperative effort 
is called Indonesia-Malaysia Coordinated Patrol, or simply called the MALINDO.180 The 
MALINDO required two warships from each state but carried out patrols four times a 
year only for 10 days each or a total of 40 days in a year.181 Therefore, MALINDO is 
limited in terms of days of operation compared to INDOSIN. 
To enhance the security cooperation in the Strait of Malacca, however, Indonesia 
and Malaysia also established another joint patrol namely the OPTIMA MALINDO that 
has involved civilian institutions such as the customs office, the Directorate General of 
Sea Transportation search and rescue (SAR), and the police. The OPTIMA MALINDO is 
held once a year for seven days.182 Hence, even though MALINDO is limited in terms of 
duration of operation, it managed to involve civilian institutions from both countries into 
the coordinated patrol.  
MALINDO’s area of operation in the Straits of Malacca has operational 
challenges to provide quick responses to piracy or armed robbery incidents. The 
MALINDO’s vast area of operations stretches from the westernmost sector, located 
between Jamboaye of Indonesia, and Tanjung Ru of Malaysia, to the easternmost sector 
between Balai Karimun Island of Indonesia, and Kukup of Malaysia. These areas were 
prone to piracy activities. Considering the vast area of operations, therefore, the 
enforcement vessels are dispersed at the naval base along the strait to provide quick 
responses on reported incidents. For MALINDO’s purposes, the Indonesia navy 
dispersed its ships at Belawan, Dumai, and Balai Karimun Naval Base.  
E. CONCLUSION 
Indonesia’s aversion to foreign intervention in the domestic and regional affairs 
has been rooted in its bitter experiences during the revolutionary war between 1946 and 
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1949. During that period, Indonesia lacked of support from world’s major powers for its 
independence. These experiences later drove Indonesia to the bebas-aktif (independent-
active) foreign policy to avoid aligning Indonesia with one of the competing blocs during 
the Cold War period.  
Under Suharto’s administration, Indonesia was a strong advocate for regional 
cooperation. Indonesia’s elites believe that genuine cooperation can be achieved only 
through intramural cooperation among ASEAN states.183 Therefore, in that sense, 
Indonesia values ASEAN as an important tool to promote peace and security in the 
region rather than reliance on extra-regional powers. 
Indonesia’s elites consider the Malacca Straits as a regional security issue. 
Geographically, the Malacca Straits are adjacent to four ASEAN countries, namely 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. Legally, Indonesia and Malaysia have 
claimed territorial waters in the straits. Conversely, Singapore prefers to keep the straits 
open as international straits, as described in Chapter II. ASEAN, however, prefers to 
solve their regional security issues in their own way without foreign intervention or 
interference. Therefore, Indonesia believed that the security in the Malacca Straits was 
better served through regional maritime security cooperation, instead of involving foreign 
powers in the strait. 
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IV. THE REJECTION AND THE ACCEPTANCE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines whether Indonesia’s sensitivity about sovereignty in the 
Malacca Straits, and its preference for regional cooperation, explained in the previous 
chapters, determines Indonesia’s policy toward multilateral security cooperation 
initiatives in the Malacca Straits. This chapter argues that the combination of these two 
factors had caused Indonesia’s policy in rejecting and in accepting multilateral security 
cooperation in the Straits. Therefore, to explain the argument, this chapter is divided into 
two sections. The first section examines multilateral security cooperation initiatives in the 
Malacca Straits since 2004 and how Indonesia responded to each of those initiatives. The 
second section discusses the findings on how those responses related to Indonesia’s 
sensitivity about its sovereignty in the Malacca Straits, and Indonesia’s preference for 
regional cooperation.  
B. MULTILATERAL MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION 
INITIATIVES IN THE MALACCA STRAITS   
Prior to 2004, Indonesia had never engaged in any multilateral security 
cooperation, especially in the Malacca Straits. As explained in Chapter III, regarding 
security issues, Indonesia preferred maintaining security cooperation within a bilateral 
framework with its neighbors, instead of a multilateral one. Therefore, along with its 
unilateral security patrol, Indonesia maintained the bilateral MALINDO and the 
INDOSIN coordinated patrol with Malaysia and Singapore respectively.  
In the early 2000s, the international community became worried over the 
increasing piracy incidents in the Malacca Straits, and the possibility that piracy could be 
lumped with terrorist activities. Even though the U.S. intelligence services had found no 
evidence that the piracy activities in the Malacca Straits were linked to terrorist networks 
in Southeast Asia, many believed that the probability of these networks being joined with 
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piracy was logical.184 Singapore, for instance, whose economy relies on the security of 
the straits, was cautious both about terrorist attacks in the straits and the linkage with 
pirates.185 Teo Chee Hean, then Singapore’s defense minister, contended that it was 
beyond the capacity of any single state to safeguard the straits. Similarly, Eltimios 
Mitropoulos, then the secretary-general of the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO), suggested that an international effort was needed to counter this terror threat.186 
Therefore, in that context, the idea of multilateral cooperation became relevant to the 
security cooperation framework in the straits.  
Since 2004, four significant important multilateral security initiatives were 
proposed to the littoral states in the Malacca Straits. They included the Regional 
Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), the MALSINDO, the Eyes in the Sky (EiS), and the 
Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against 
Ships (ReCAAP). The Indonesian government responded differently to these initiatives; 
RMSI and ReCAAP were rejected, but the MALSINDO and EiS were accepted. 
Therefore, this section explores these multilateral initiatives, and how the Indonesian 
government responded to these initiatives. 
1. The Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) 
In 2004, the United States proposed the Regional Maritime Strategy Initiative 
(RMSI) against transnational threats in the Southeast Asia region. On 31 March of that 
year, Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, then Chief of U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), 
gave a statement before the House Armed Services Committee on U.S. Pacific Command 
postures.187 In his statement, Admiral Fargo argued that the Regional Maritime Security 
Initiative was vital to the U.S. president’s Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the 
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State Department’s Maritime Security Initiative (MSI) against transnational threats, 
especially in the Southeast Asia region.188  
The RMSI intended to leverage international and regional capabilities against 
transnational security threats, especially in the Southeast Asia region. During his speech, 
Admiral Fargo explained that “the goal of RMSI is to develop a partnership of willing 
regional nations with varying capabilities and capacities to identify, monitor, and 
intercept transnational maritime threats under existing international and domestic 
laws.”189 Hence, the aim of the initiatives was to build and synchronize inter-agency and 
international capacity, to harness available and emerging technologies, to develop a 
maritime situational awareness to match the picture that is available for international 
airspace, and to develop responsive decision-making structures that can call on 
immediately available maritime forces to act when required.190 Therefore, the initiative 
could have been an alternative to regional efforts in combating piracy in the Malacca 
Straits. 
The basic idea of the RMSI was to provide standby forces in the straits that would 
be deployed after the decision to act was made. Hence, the structure of RMSI consisted 
of three components: first, a picture compilation of the traffic in the Straits of Malacca 
and the Straits of Singapore to provide the data and analysis; second, decision-making 
structures that decide what action should be taken in the occurring situation; and third, 
standby maritime forces that execute the decision has been made.191 The questions then 
would be, who would act as standby forces in the Straits? Who would give the order if 
there were an incident? 
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Following the testimony, the international media falsely reported that USPACOM 
intended to deploy U.S. Marines and its naval vessels to patrol the Malacca Straits. 
France-based news agency the Agence France-Presse (AFP) quoted Admiral Fargo: 
We’re looking at things like high-speed vessels, putting special operations 
forces on high-speed vessels, putting Marines on high-speed vessels . . . to 
conduct effective interdiction, he told U.S. legislators in hearings last 
week on Budget allocations for his command.192 
This news gained various reactions from the littoral states in the Malacca Straits. 
Indonesia and Malaysia strongly opposed Admiral Fargo’s proposal. Conversely, 
Singapore welcomed the initiative and offered to provide the base for the U.S. forces.  
In response, on April 16, 2004, the Indonesian Foreign Ministry’s spokesman, 
Marty Natalegawa, issued a statement rejecting the RMSI proposal. He stated:  
The security of the Straits is the responsibility of the littoral states; the 
waters of the Straits of Malacca are part of the territorial waters of the 
coastal states over which they have sovereignty; and any activities or 
maneuvers in the Straits by foreign vessel, which are not exercising the 
right of transit passage—whether they are for civilian or military 
purposes—are subject to the consent of the respective coastal states.193  
Malaysia also rejected the RMSI proposal. On 7 May 2005, after a meeting with 
Indonesian Foreign Minister Hasan Wirajuda in Jakarta, Malaysian Foreign Minister 
Dato’ Hamid Albar contended that it was the responsibility of the littoral states to 
maintain the safety of navigation and the security in the Malacca Straits.194 Therefore, 
both Indonesia and Malaysia strongly rejected the proposal. 
While both Indonesia and Malaysia rejected the RMSI proposal, Singapore, 
however, welcomed the proposal. Indeed, Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister Tony Tan 
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invited countries outside the region to help patrol the Malacca Straits.195 In response, 
Indonesia’s Minister of Politics and Security Hari Sabarno argued that Singapore should 
first consult with Indonesia and Malaysia before asking the United States to patrol the 
Straits.196 Similarly, Malaysia, like Indonesia, opposed Singapore’s position. Malaysia’s 
Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak argued, “Singapore could not unilaterally invite 
the U.S. to patrol the Straits.”197 Moreover, Malaysia also contended that security issues 
should not compromise the country’s sovereignty.198 As a result, the RMSI proposal had 
divided the littoral states into two blocs. Singapore, on the one hand, accepted the 
proposal; Indonesia and Malaysia, on the other hand, rejected the proposal. 
United States officials tried explaining the misunderstanding to both Indonesia 
and Malaysia. On 20 June 2004, Admiral Fargo met with Malaysian Deputy Prime 
Minister Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak and contended that the United States had no plan to 
deploy its own force to patrol the straits. Instead, the United States claimed to support the 
littoral states with an intelligence and information exchange.199 The U.S. Defense 
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, during his visit to Indonesia in the same month, again 
stressed the U.S. position on RMSI, namely that the U.S. had no intention to send 
military forces or set up a military base in the straits.200 Similarly, the U.S. ambassador to 
Indonesia, Ralph L. Boyce, explained Admiral Fargo’s statement as being purely 
hypothetical.201  
Even though the United States had already clarified the misunderstanding, 
Indonesia kept rejecting the RMSI proposal. In Jakarta, Indonesian civil and military 
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officials continued their opposition to the proposal. Among them, Admiral Bernard Ken 
Sondakh, then Chief of Indonesian Navy, asserted that the RMSI proposal was 
“baseless.”202 He said, “There is a grand strategy to paint a bad picture over our waters, 
as if the Indonesian Navy is not strong and the crimes at sea are increasing. … Indeed, if 
we can’t show the ability to guard the Straits of Malacca, the International forces may get 
in.”203 Similarly, opposing the RMSI, Nugroho Wisnumurti, a former director general for 
political affairs in the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, argues that the 
development of U.S. Marines in the Straits would harm Indonesian national interest in the 
Straits.204 In the House of Representatives, Amris Hasan, then the Chairman of 
Commission I (Foreign Affairs and Defense), categorized the initiative as an act of 
intervention and a violation of Indonesia’s sovereignty.205 In fact, other parliament 
members warned the United States not to intervene in Indonesia’s sovereign territory and 
declared a readiness to support an increase in the military budget to improve naval 
capacity.206 Therefore, the sovereignty concern over Indonesian waters in the Malacca 
Straits became the central theme of Indonesia’s rejection of the RMSI proposal. 
2. The MALSINDO 
In response to international pressures over the security in the Malacca Straits, the 
littoral states enhanced security cooperation in the Straits. Soon after rejecting RMSI, 
Indonesia proposed a trilateral naval patrol in the Malacca Straits involving Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Singapore.207 Later, on 18 June 2004, these states agreed to the formation 
of a joint task force on maritime security within a trilateral cooperation framework.208 
That kind of cooperation had never existed before among these countries. Indonesia, 
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Malaysia, and Singapore expanded their security cooperation from a bilateral to a 
trilateral framework.209 
Finally, on 20 July 2004, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore launched the 
MALSINDO (Malaysia-Singapore-Indonesia) coordinated patrol. At an operational level, 
17 naval vessels of the three countries served on this year-round patrol. Each country, 
Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia, set up a naval command center in Batam, Changi, 
and Lumut respectively.210 At the opening ceremony in the Batam waters, General 
Endriatono Sutarto, then Indonesia’s armed forces commander, emphasized that the goal 
was to enhance safety and security against transnational crimes, especially piracy and 
armed robbery in the straits.211 Hence, the littoral countries found a way to cooperate in a 
multilateral framework to secure the straits.  
The MALSINDO became the first indigenous multilateral security cooperation in 
the Malacca Straits. Indeed, this was the first multilateral security cooperation in 
Southeast Asia without the involvement of an extraregional power in the region.212 
General Endriartono outlined that although the establishment of the MALSINDO 
coordinated patrol was to fulfill littoral states’ responsibility to secure the straits, the door 
was open for other countries to take part either directly or indirectly. He stressed, 
however, “If they want to join, it should first be approved by all three countries.”213  
Criticism to the MALSINDO came right from the start. The IMB criticized the 
system of cooperation that prohibited other parties from crossing the territorial border 
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while pursuing pirates.214 Similarly, J.N. Mak criticized the cooperation as a public 
relations campaign to show the world that the littoral states were taking serious action to 
secure the straits. Despite the criticism, however, the MALSINDO showed significant 
results in suppressing the numbers of piracy incidents in the Malacca Straits. There was a 
noticeable decrease in the number of attacks in 2005.215 Indeed, during the first six 
months of cooperation, the number of piracy incidents in the straits decreased by 10 
percent.216 Hence, despite the critics, the MALSINDO was considered a success.  
Moreover, regarding the military pact issue, Indonesia did not consider the 
MALSINDO as a form of military pact even though it was a created within a multilateral 
framework. As explained in Chapter III, Indonesia is very cautious not to be involved in 
any military pact. Therefore, the avoidance of military pacts had also hindered Indonesia 
from taking part in multilateral security cooperation in the past. Admiral Sondakh, 
however, told The Jakarta Post that Indonesia supported the cooperation and assured its 
fellow ASEAN members that the MALSINDO was not a military pact and would not 
become a military pact in the region.217 Therefore, Indonesia strongly supported the 
establishment of the MALSINDO. 
3. The Eyes in the Sky (EiS) 
In June 2005, during the Fourth Asian Security Conference (known as the 
Shangri-La Dialogue) in Singapore, the Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister and the 
Minister of Defense, Dato’ Tun Abdul Razak, called for more efforts in enhancing 
multilateral cooperation in the straits. During his speech, he reiterated that the 
safeguarding of the straits is a primary responsibility of the littoral states. On the other 
hand, recognizing the limitation of the littoral states in bearing the responsibility alone, 
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he called for an international contribution. Although he recognized the need for an 
international contribution to enhance security in the straits, he also highlighted that the 
arrangement to secure the straits must not impinge on the territorial integrity and national 
sovereignty of the littoral states.218 At the end of his speech, he proposed the use of “the 
eyes in the skies,” along with coastal radar linked to satellites and radio tracking 
technology to provide real-time information, data, and analysis for the littoral states’ 
enforcement forces.219 Later, the notion of “Eyes in the Sky” would be used as the name 
for multilateral air patrol cooperation in the Malacca Straits. 
Littoral countries needed to enhance their security cooperation in the Malacca 
Straits because the international community still considered the straits as dangerous 
waters even though the MALSINDO had shown its initial success. Indeed, on 20 June 
2005, the Joint War Committee (JWC) of Lloyd’s Market Association declared the 
Malacca Straits a high-risk zone and added it into the list of areas which are at risk for 
war, strikes, terrorism, and related perils.220 Hence, this decision then caused increased 
insurance premiums for the ships that transit the Malacca Straits. As a result, the decision 
not only hurt the shipping companies but also the littoral states, whose economy 
depended on the straits. The littoral states realized that unless they took more effective 
action to secure the Malacca Straits, the straits would not be removed from the JWC 
high-risk zone list.221 Therefore, Malaysia’s initiative in enhancing maritime security 
cooperation in the straits became relevant. 
Finally, on 13 September 2005, the three littoral states enhanced security 
cooperation in the straits with the establishment of the Eyes in the Sky (EiS) coordinated 
air patrol over the Malacca Straits. Under the EiS, each littoral state would provide two 
maritime aircraft per week to patrol the straits. The participants’ aircraft would be 
allowed to fly above another participating country’s waters in the straits, not less than 
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three miles from that country’s land. Each aircraft also has a Combined Maritime Patrol 
Team (CMPT) on board, comprising a military officer from each of the participating 
states.222 For operational purposes, the Straits would be divided into four sectors, with 
each patrol usually covering two sectors.223  
Indonesia supported the establishment of the Eyes in the Sky (EiS) air patrol in 
the Malacca Straits. Within the EiS framework, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore also 
invited Thailand to join the cooperation since Thailand lay next to the Straits.224 Indeed, 
the establishment of EiS would later raise a new initiative to improve the MALSINDO 
sea patrol framework. Colonel Surya Wiranto, then the Assistant of Operational Affairs at 
the Indonesian Navy’s Western Fleet Command, said that Indonesia had proposed to 
enhance the MALSINDO coordinated patrol memberships to include Thailand, and to 
widen the sea patrol capacity to allow enforcement vessels to conduct hot pursuit up to 
five miles into neighbors’ waters.225 Therefore, the EiS initiative was not only accepted 
but also inspired Indonesia to enhance the MALSINDO sea patrol framework. 
4. The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and 
Armed Robbery Against Ships (ReCAAP)  
Initially, Japan proposed the initiative. Shortly after 9/11, in November 2001, 
during the ASEAN+3 Summit in Brunei, the Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi 
proposed an initiative to establish a government-level working group to study the 
possibility of forming a regional antipiracy cooperation in the region.226 After a long 
process through a series of meetings hosted by Japan since 2001, the Regional 
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Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships 
(ReCAAP) initiative was finalized on 11 November 2004. Finally, on 28 April 2005, the 
agreement was concluded in Singapore.227 As a result, ReCAAP became a new 
alternative for multilateral cooperation in securing the straits. 
On 4 September 2006, ReCAAP effectively entered into force. The purpose of the 
organization was to accelerate incident response by the member states through providing 
accurate statistics of piracy and armed robbery (PAR) incidents in the straits.228 
Therefore, the ReCAAP had three aims: information sharing, capacity building, and 
cooperative arrangement;229 and the key pillar to achieve those aims was the 
establishment of Information Sharing Center (ISC).230 As the host of the ReCAAP 
Information Sharing Center (ISC), Singapore agreed to bear the $2 million setup cost, 
along with another $2 million for the annual operational costs of the ISC.231 The 
ReCAAP ISC was launched on 29 November 2006, and later was formally recognized as 
an international organization on 30 January 2007.232 Therefore, basically the ReCAAP 
has found strong support regionally and internationally. 
Although the ReCAAP had been recognized regionally and internationally, 
Indonesia and Malaysia did not ratify or sign the ReCAAP agreement. On 28 April 2005, 
16 countries drafted the multilateral cooperation: Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, China, 
India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Republic of Korea, 
Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam. On 4 September 2006, all of these 
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countries, except Indonesia and Malaysia, ratified and signed the agreement.233 As a 
result, ReCAAP was established without Indonesia and Malaysia’s participation. 
Indonesia has several explanations for its rejection. The common explanation was 
that Indonesia contended that the establishment of ReCAAP was not urgent since the 
MALSINDO and EiS coordinated patrols already in the straits.234 Additionally, regarding 
Indonesia perception to the ReCAAP ISC, one Indonesian official from the Foreign 
Ministry office explained that Indonesia had worry about the possibility that the ISC 
might publish reports unfair to member states. He shared concerns, arguing that the IMB 
had misrepresented the piracy incidents in Malaysia waters as having occurred in 
Indonesia waters because the center is located in Kuala Lumpur.235 Juwono Sudharsono, 
then the Indonesian defense minister, however, stated that Indonesia determined to 
postpone ratification of ReCAAP because the initiative could have impinged on 
Indonesian sovereignty.236 His statement clearly explained why Indonesia did not join 
ReCAAP while most ASEAN countries have joined it. Therefore, considering 
Indonesia’s rejection to ReCAAP, Indonesia’s sensitivity over its sovereignty in the 
straits has ruled out its preference toward regional cooperation. 
C. FINDINGS   
The discussion in this chapter demonstrates that Indonesia remains cautious about 
international efforts and initiatives in securing the Malacca Straits. Indeed, both 
Indonesia’s Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 
adamantly rejected the RMSI and ReCAAP proposals due to sovereignty concerns and 
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the wariness of international efforts to internationalize the straits. Hence, regarding 
international efforts to enhance the security cooperation in the straits, Indonesia’s 
sensitivity and its wariness of internationalizing the straits still remains a big challenge 
for the extraregional states’ security initiatives in securing the Malacca Straits. 
Again, due to sovereignty concerns, although Indonesia supported the 
MALSINDO and Eyes in the Sky (EiS), and willingly accepted cross-border coordinated 
patrol within these frameworks, it has limited the participants to the littoral states only. 
Therefore, regarding regional cooperation in the straits, even though Indonesia prefers 
regional cooperation, it would still limit the cooperation in the Straits when dealing with 
the sovereignty issue.  
On the other hand, even though Indonesia rejected extraregional states’ 
involvement in patrolling the straits, Indonesia welcomes international support in 
securing the straits with aids, technical assistance, and training. For instance, in May 
2005, Indonesia and the United States conducted a joint antiterrorism exercise in the sea 
off Jakarta, Indonesia.237 Moreover, from 2006 to 2008, Indonesia received technical 
assistance under the U.S. 1206 project to establish Integrated Maritime Surveillance 
System (IMSS) along the east Sumatra coast to secure the Malacca Straits.238 Therefore, 
even though Indonesia remains cautious about the international effort in securing the 
Straits, regarding security cooperation with the extraregional powers, Indonesia prefers to 
cooperate in a bilateral framework. 
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter demonstrates that Indonesia’s sensitivity about its sovereignty in the 
Malacca Straits has played a significant role in rejecting the RMSI and the ReCAAP, and 
limiting the MALSINDO and EiS. Regarding the RMSI, Indonesia firmly rejected the 
proposal, contending that the deployment of extraregional military forces in the Malacca 
Straits would impinge on Indonesian sovereignty. Indonesia continues to reject the 
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initiative even though Admiral Fargo and U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld had 
clarified that the United States did not intend to send military forces to patrol the straits. 
Similarly, Indonesia also rejected the ReCAAP and has yet to ratify the agreement due to 
sovereignty concerns. Therefore, Indonesia’s sensitivity about sovereignty in the Malacca 
Straits, explained in Chapter II, still plays a significant role in affecting Indonesia’s 
maritime security cooperation policy in the Malacca Straits. 
Conversely, this chapter demonstrates that, although Indonesia prefers to 
cooperate with other ASEAN members, as explained in Chapter III, Indonesia limits its 
cooperation when dealing with its sovereignty concern. For instance, in 2006, Indonesia 
did not ratify the ReCAAP agreement, even though most ASEAN member states had 
ratified it. Indonesia’s rejection of ReCAAP may also stem from the Indonesian 
perception that the ReCAAP would internationalize the straits, and as a result, would 
weaken Indonesia’s position in safeguarding the Malacca Straits among major maritime 
powers. Therefore, Indonesia’s sensitivity about its sovereignty in the Malacca Straits 
still plays a major role in shaping Indonesian policy in the Malacca Straits. 
In summary, this thesis finds the following: first, regarding international efforts to 
enhance the security cooperation in the Straits, Indonesia’s sensitivity and its wariness of 
internationalizing the straits remains a big challenge for the extraregional states’ security 
initiatives in securing the Malacca Straits; second, regarding the regional cooperation in 
the straits, even though Indonesia prefers regional cooperation, it would still limit its 
cooperation when dealing with the sovereignty issue; and third, regarding the security 
cooperation with extraregional powers, Indonesia, prefers a bilateral security cooperation 
framework in securing the straits. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This thesis addressed the question of whether Indonesia’s sensitivity about its 
sovereignty in the Malacca Straits, and its preference toward regional cooperation, have 
affected Indonesia’s policy regarding multilateral security cooperation in the straits. The 
straits have long been one of the major sea-lanes for trading between the East and the 
West, used for transferring goods and oil back and forth throughout the entire region in 
Asia and the Middle East. Moreover, the Malacca Straits’ strategic position is also 
important for naval mobility. Considering all of these factors, the Malacca Straits has 
been regarded as one of the most important straits in the world. As been discussed 
throughout the chapters, Indonesia, however, is sensitive about its sovereignty in the 
straits. 
As discussed in Chapter II, Indonesia’s sensitivity in the Malacca Straits stemmed 
from conflicting interests between Indonesia and the user states of the straits, especially 
the major maritime countries. On 13 December 1957, Indonesia declared its archipelagic 
state concept. The declaration, in essence, not only extended Indonesia’s territorial claim 
from three miles to 12 miles, but also promoted that all the waters surrounding the 
Indonesian archipelago are integral parts of Indonesian territory. Later, in 1960, 
Indonesia had unilaterally claimed its archipelagic waters, including the straits, through 
the enactment of Act No. 4 regarding Indonesian waters. Indonesia bolstered its claim in 
the straits after the UNCLOS 1982 acknowledged its archipelagic state concept. 
Therefore, Indonesia insisted that the Malacca Straits be included within its territorial 
waters.  
Additionally, the agreement between Indonesia and Malaysia on the delimitation 
of territorial waters and the continental shelf has strengthened Indonesia’s assertiveness 
over territorial claims in the Malacca Straits. Since 1969, Indonesia has had a strong 
alliance regarding territorial waters claims in the straits. As a result, on 16 November 
1971, Indonesia and Malaysia made a declaration that the Malacca Straits were not 
international waterways. In the end, Indonesia gained international recognition as an 
archipelagic state through the adoption of the 1982 UNCLOS. Conversely, the major 
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maritime countries such as the United States and Japan rejected any territorial claims in 
the Straits.  
The major maritime powers asserted that the Malacca Straits’ status was that of 
international straits; therefore, the management of the safety and the security in the straits 
should not be surrendered to the littoral states alone. In this context, Japan had proposed 
to internationalize the safety of navigation in the straits. In 1967, Japan proposed the 
establishment of Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) to the London-based Sub-Committee 
on the Safety of Navigation of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative 
Organization (IMCO). Japan also rejected any territorial claims in the straits. On the 
other hand, the United States, even though not fully supportive of the littoral states’ 
demand for the extension of territorial limits, was ready to recognize the 12 NM 
territorial claims, including in the international straits as long as the littoral states 
preserved the right of free transit for international uses. Therefore, these conflicting 
interests have bolstered Indonesia’s sensitivity about its sovereignty in the Malacca 
Straits. 
Chapter III demonstrates that Indonesia’s aversion to foreign intervention in the 
domestic and regional affairs is rooted in its bitter experiences during the revolutionary 
war between 1946 and 1949. During that period, Indonesia lacked of support from the 
world’s major powers for its independence. These experiences later drove Indonesia to 
the bebas-aktif (independent-active) foreign policy to avoid aligning with one of the 
competing blocs during the Cold War. Additionally, under Suharto’s administration, 
Indonesia had been a strong advocate for regional cooperation. Indonesia’s elites believed 
that genuine cooperation only could be achieved through intramural cooperation among 
ASEAN states. Therefore, in that sense, Indonesia values ASEAN as an important tool to 
promote peace and security in the region rather than to rely on extraregional powers. 
Additionally, Indonesia’s elites consider the Malacca Straits a regional security 
issue. Geographically, the Malacca Straits are adjacent to four ASEAN countries, namely 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. Legally, Indonesia and Malaysia have 
claimed territorial waters in the straits. Conversely, Singapore prefers the straits to remain 
as international straits. ASEAN, however, prefers to solve regional security issues 
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without foreign intervention or interference. Therefore, Indonesia has considered the 
security in the Malacca Straits better served by regional maritime security cooperation, 
instead of involving foreign powers in the straits. 
Chapter IV demonstrates that Indonesia’s sensitivity about its sovereignty in the 
Malacca Straits has played a significant role in rejecting the RMSI and the ReCAAP, and 
limiting the MALSINDO and EiS. In summary, this thesis finds the following: first, 
regarding international efforts to enhance the security cooperation in the straits, 
Indonesia’s sensitivity and its wariness of internationalizing the straits remains a big 
challenge for the extraregional states’ security initiatives in securing the Malacca Straits; 
second, regarding the regional cooperation in the straits, even though Indonesia prefers 
regional cooperation, it would still limit its cooperation when dealing with the 
sovereignty issue; and third, regarding the security cooperation with extraregional 
powers, Indonesia prefers bilateral security cooperation framework in securing the straits. 
This thesis has stated that Indonesia’s policy toward multilateral cooperation in 
the Malacca Straits has been limited by its sovereignty concern. Therefore, to strengthen 
and enhance the security cooperation in the straits, between Indonesia, littoral states, and 
the user states, all stakeholders, this thesis proposes following recommendations: 
• The user states, like the United States and Japan and other major maritime 
powers, could play an important role to improve littoral states’ capacity 
and capability through better coordination. They can support Indonesia by 
providing communication, surveillance, and interdiction capabilities by 
aid, finance, and training. 
• The user states also could improve maritime security in the Malacca 
Straits by helping the Indonesian government to improve its governance 
capacities and support its economic growth against poverty, which is the 
root cause of piracy and armed robbery in the Malacca Straits. 
• The littoral states could increase the level of cooperation among their law 
enforcement forces in the Malacca Straits by conducting more frequent 
patrols in problematic areas, and enhance information and intelligence 
sharing among these countries. 
• Indonesia could increase its capacity and capability in securing the straits. 
This will be possible if the Indonesian government commits in enhancing 
its Maritime Domain Awareness, especially in the Malacca Straits. 
• There is a lack of research on how to enhance multilateral cooperation 
against piracy and armed robbery in the Malacca Straits that involve all 
stakeholders, without hampering Indonesia’s sovereignty in the straits. 
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Therefore, this thesis suggests further research on possible multilateral 
cooperation in the straits, especially the one that has a direct impact to 
suppress the root cause of piracy along the Malacca Straits—poverty. 
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